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Introduction
In September 1993, the World Bank (the Bank) created the Inspection
Panel (the Panel).' The creation of the Panel was, at the time, an unprece-
dented effort to increase the Bank's accountability. 2 Prior to the establish-
ment of the Panel, the Bank had engaged in a number of projects that
devastated local populations and caused significant environmental dam-
age. 3 One highly visible project involved the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the
Narmada River in India.4 In the late 1980s, the Bank advanced India a loan
to build a dam that would supply water to 30 million people and irrigate
crops to feed another 20 million.5 The project was deeply flawed, however,
requiring the unanticipated relocation of thousands of people and threat-
ening to cause widespread soil erosion. 6
Lewis Preston, then President of the World Bank, commissioned an
independent review of the project, known as the Morse Commission (the
Commission).7 The Commission's report revealed that the Bank had per-
vasively failed to follow its own social and environmental policies in pro-
ject lending. 8 Another internal review of the Bank, known as the
1. The Inspection Panel for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, International Development Association: Operating Procedures, Aug. 19, 1994, 34
I.L.M. 510, 511 [hereinafter Operating Procedures].
2. See Kirk Herberston & David Hunter, Emerging Standards for Sustainable Finance
of the Energy Sector, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Spring 2007, at 4, 6.
3. Id. at 5.
4. David B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental
Standards at International Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 437, 438-39 (2008).
5. Stephanie C. Guyett, Note, Environment and Lending: Lessons of the World Bank,
Hope for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 889, 905-07 (1992); Jyotsna Singh, World: South Asia Narmada: A History of Con-
troversy, BBC ONLINE NETWORK, July 29, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/
407326.stm.
6. See Jona Razzaque, Linking Human Rights, Development, and Environment: Exper-
iences from Litigation in South Asia, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 587, 595-98 (2007).
7. See generally THE INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., THE WORLD BANK,
ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON 2 (2003) [here-
inafter INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/TenYear8_07.pdf; BRADFORD MORSE & THOMAS R.
BERGER, SARDAR SAROVAR: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW (1992); Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the
Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 529, 568 (2000).
8. Rajagopal, supra note 7, at 568. The Commission recommended the Bank with-
draw from the project. Id. Nevertheless, the Bank Management decided to press for-
ward, and Preston personally advocated action to remedy the project's shortcomings.
Steven A. Holmes, India Cancels Dam Loan From World Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993,
at A5. Given the significant public sentiment against the dam project and the frequent
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Wapenhans Report, described a "culture of approval" at the Bank-an atti-
tude that emphasized increasing the Bank's loan portfolio without ade-
quately taking into account the social and environmental consequences of
the project lending. 9 After unrelenting pressure from environmental and
human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the World Bank
established the Inspection Panel with the hope of bringing transparency to
the Bank's project lending.' 0
The Inspection Panel is comprised of three members who are
appointed by the World Bank, but the Panel is ostensibly independent from
the larger institution.1 Generally, the Panel is charged with investigating
complaints filed by parties in borrower countries who believe that the Bank
is violating its policies or procedures in the design, preparation, or imple-
mentation of a Bank-funded project. 12 The Panel deals exclusively with
claims relating to the International Bank of Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD), which focuses on providing loans to "middle income and
creditworthy poor countries" and the International Development Associa-
tion (IDA), which "focuses on the poorest countries in the world." 13 The
Panel's jurisdiction does not extend to the risk-mitigation or private-sector
investment arms of the World Bank.14
To bring a claim to the Panel, the party requesting investigation
(Requester) must believe that actual or likely harm will result from the
human rights violations against protesters and NGO leaders, the Indian Government
ultimately withdrew from the loan agreement in 1993. Id.
9. See THE WORLD BANK, EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: KEY TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT:
REPORT OF THE WORLD BANK'S PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE iii (1992); Dana L.
Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARv.
HUM. RTs. J. 205, 217 (2002).
10. Hunter, supra note 4, at 438-39, 442.
11. Maurizio Ragazzi, Inspection Panel Operating Procedures Including Executive
Directors' Resolution and Explanatory Memorandum of the General Counsel: Introductory
Note 34 I.L.M. 503, 503-04 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id.; The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
About Us, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/O,,content
MDK:20046292-menuPK:51123588-pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,
00.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
14. Ragazzi, supra note 11, at 503. The Bank's private-sector investment arm is the
International Finance Corporation (IFC); the risk mitigation department is the Multilat-
eral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). See Hunter, supra note 4, at 443. Instead of
being subject to the mandate of the Inspection Panel, these institutions are reviewed by
the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO). See Compliance Advisor
Ombudsman, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2008). See gener-
ally COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES (2007) [hereinafter CAO
GUIDELINES]. The CAO uses mediation and other dispute resolution methods, followed
by compliance audits of questioned projects, and ultimately provides advice to the insti-
tutions' senior management about the application and effectiveness of the IFC and
MIGA's polices. Id. at 5, 17. While it is beyond the scope of this article, members of
civil society have called for the creation of an additional accountability mechanism for
MICA and IFC based, in part, on the existing Inspection Panel. See. e.g., CTR. FOR INT'L
ENVTL. LAW & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH-U.S., DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW
PANEL FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GuARAN-
TEE AGENCY (Aug. 15, 1997), http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/ifcres.html.
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Bank's failure to adhere to its policies and procedures. 15 Requesters must
also bring their concerns to the Bank's attention before filing a claim. 1 6
The Panel's functions and procedures are outlined in its Operating Proce-
dures and its founding Resolution. 17 As of May 2008, there have been
fifty-two requests for inspections. 18
Despite its novelty when it was established in 1993, there are many
critiques of the Panel. Generally, critics question whether the Panel truly
increases the accountability of the World Bank on the whole. 19 Critics
often point out that the Panel has a limited substantive mandate and no
ability to grant relief.20 Furthermore, the Panel fails to give affected people
a true voice in the outcome of an investigation. After the Panel receives the
claim, the Bank rarely considers the affected communities' desires for reso-
lution. In essence, the Panel is compliance-oriented and problem-solving is
not a principal focus.
2 1
This article proposes an alternative to the current Inspection Panel
process that would offer real and meaningful accountability. Our proposal
envisions a two-stage process that first would require claimant communi-
ties to file a Request for Claim Resolution with a newly created Office of
Claims Resolution (OCR) at the World Bank. The Director of the OCR
would appoint an independent Intermediator who would attempt to solve
the problem created by the Bank's alleged noncompliance with its own pol-
icies and procedures. We expect that the Intermediator would resolve most
claims at the administrative level. If, however, the Intermediator failed to
resolve the claim or if the Bank agreed to corrective measures but failed to
abide by them, claimant communities would have the option to institute
arbitration proceedings against the Bank. The proceedings would be con-
ducted based on a modified version of the Optional Rules for Arbitration
between International Organizations and Private Parties which is produced
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The arbitral tribunal would consist
of three arbitrators and could sit in any location that would best facilitate
the proceedings. The tribunal's decision would be public, final, and bind-
ing upon the parties. Its award could set forth corrective measures that the
15. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513.
16. Ragazzi, supra note 11, at 505. The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Panel
Process, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/O,,
contentMDK:20173251 -menuPK:64129467-pagePK:64129751 -piPK:64128378-theSite
PK:380794,00.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Panel Process].
17. See generally Operating Procedures, supra note 1; Panel Process, supra note 16.
18. See The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Requests by Request Number, http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:202
21606-menuPK:64129250-pagePK:64129751 -piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.
html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (providing a list of all of the requests for inspection and
the supporting documentation relating to each request).
19. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 206.
20. See id. at 217-19.
21. But see Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh Nanwani, Responsibility of International Organi-
zations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral Development Banks, 27 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 177, 220-21 (2005) (stating that while the Inspection Panel is focused on com-
pliance review, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) is the problem-solving
cornerstone).
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Bank would be required to follow to bring it into compliance with its poli-
cies and procedures. The tribunal could also award damages to the claim-
ant community.
Our article is structured as follows. Part I discusses the background
behind the establishment of the Bank's Inspection Panel. Part II explains
the Inspection Panel procedure. Part III sets forth the major criticisms of
the Inspection Panel. Part IV reviews the various proposals observers have
made to reform the Inspection Panel in light of the criticisms. Part V sets
forth our proposal. The article concludes with a discussion of why we
believe our proposal improves upon other reform proposals by using an
independent arbitration mechanism to bring about effective accountability
on the part of the World Bank.
I. Development of the Inspection Panel
The findings of the Morse Commission and the Wapenhans Report
were two of the major impetuses for the establishment of an accountability
mechanism at the World Bank. 22 Charged with evaluating the Bank's role
in the Sardar Sarovar Dam and Canal project on the Narmarda River in
India, 23 the Morse Commission was the entity responsible for the first
"independent review of a Bank-supported project under implementa-
tion."'2 4 After its investigation, the Commission published a report in June
1992 illustrating the Bank's major failures-particularly the environmental
and human-rights problems resulting from the Bank's refusal to follow its
own policies and procedures during the project's execution.25
The Wapenhans Report, the product of a committee of Bank personnel
commissioned to review the Bank's operating procedures generally, was
issued a few months later in November 1992.26 The report highlighted the
Bank's need to change its "approval culture," whereby the Bank often disre-
garded the "commitment of borrowers and their implementing agencies,"
as well as "the degree of 'ownership' assumed by borrowers" over such
22. See generally IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRAC-
TICE (2d ed. 2000); Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Com-
plaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553, 557-65
(1994).
23. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 5-8 (highlighting the Bank's project on the Narmada
River as "[tihe most important case to draw public attention to the accountability
issue"). See generally Indep. Evaluation Group, The World Bank Group, Learning
from Narmada, http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewFor
JavaSearch/12A795722EA20F6E852567F5005D8933 (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [here-
inafter Learning from Narmada] (discussing the problems that the projects posed for
western India).
24. Learning from Narmada, supra note 23.
25. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 2. Ultimately, the Commission
recommended that the Bank reconsider the project. Id. Instead, the Bank continued
with the projects under a set of standards that it developed in consultation with Indian
authorities. Learning from Narmada, supra note 23. In March 2003, the Indian govern-
ment decided to continue with the project with other sources of funding, and it
requested that the Bank cancel the remaining portion of its loan for the project. Id.
26. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 2.
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projects. 27 Given the critical findings of these two studies, the debate
within the Bank at that time was not whether the Bank should institute a
review mechanism during the implementation stage of Bank projects, but
rather what type of entity the Bank should create. 28
Generally, the proposals for a review mechanism fell into two catego-
ries: 1) proposals calling for an independent unit within the Bank 2 9 and 2)
proposals calling for a mechanism wholly independent from the Bank.30
In February 1993, four Executive Directors of the Bank submitted a memo-
randum to Bank President Lewis Preston favoring the in-house review
mechanism.3 1 As Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, the Bank's Senior Vice President
and General Counsel,32 described in the content of the memorandum, the
Directors' proposal "envisaged a small permanent unit, [to which] one to
three inspectors selected from among experienced Bank officers 'of the
highest caliber with the necessary independence,"' would be appointed.3 3
Conversely, during a U.S. House of Representatives Hearing in May
1993, various NGOs advocated for an independent, out-of-house investiga-
tory body.34 Furthermore, having decided that a permanent independent
body was the only acceptable review mechanism, the U.S. Congress
attempted to influence the Bank's decision by tying government funding to
institutional reforms. 3 5 Although the proposal never progressed beyond a
27. Id. at 2-3. The Wapenhans Report stated, in short, that to improve the perform-
ance of its portfolio, the Bank needed to change its own policies and practices. See
generally THE WORLD BANK, GETTING RESULTS: THE WORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR IMPROVING
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (1993) [hereinafter GETTING RESULTS] (summarizing the
findings of the Wapenhans Report, submitted to the Executive Directors as THE WORLD
BANK'S PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: KEY TO DEVELOP-
MENT IMPACT (1992)).
28. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 16-21 (describing the different proposals for review
mechanisms).
29. See Bradlow, supra note 22, at 567-68.
30. See id. at 565-67.
31. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 17-18.
32. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata served in this position until 1998. See The World Bank,
Archives-lbrahim F. I. Shihata Appointed Vice President and General Counsel, http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/O,,contentMD
K:64055845-menuPK:64319213-pagePK:36726-piPK:36092-theSitePK:29506,00.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
33. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 17.
34. Id. at 20-21 & n. 43 (citing numerous environmental groups who gave testi-
mony advocating for an "independent appeals commission" and outlining various
proposals).
35. Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Kormos, The American Campaign for Environmental
Reforms at the World Bank, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 211, 219-20 (1999). To empha-
size its concern with the Bank's operations, the U.S. government threatened to withhold
the tenth replenishment of the Bank's International Development Association (IDA)
funds if the Bank did not establish an inspection panel by the end of 1993. Id. The then
Chair of the Authorizing Subcommittee in the House of Representatives, Congressman
Barney Frank, apparently told the Bank's Managing Director, Ernest Stern, that Con-
gress did not have time to authorize IDA funding as long as the Bank failed to find time
to create an inspection panel. Id. at 220. More strikingly, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy,
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman at the time, wrote to Bank President
Preston in June 1993 to outline Congress' concerns over the findings of the Wapenhans
Report. Id. at 219. In that letter, Leahy stated that considering the Wapenhans Report
Vol. 41
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committee draft, that the United States wanted an inspection panel that
was wholly independent was not lost on the Bank.3 6
Other outside institutions also presented proposals for accountability
mechanisms. For example, in testimony before the Canadian Parliament
and the U.S. House of Representatives, Professor Daniel Bradlow advocated
for the appointment of an ombudsperson to handle complaints about the
Bank. 37 He emphasized that to be effective, the ombudsperson "would be
independent of the bank staff [and] should not be drawn from the bank
staff."38 Under this proposal, the ombudsperson would receive and inves-
tigate complaints from the public about the Bank's failure to comply with
its own policies and procedures and, in a purely advisory role, would make
recommendations to the Bank's Executive Directors on which complaints to
investigate and how to respond to the findings of past investigations. 3 9
Bradlow engaged in various discussions about his proposal with Bank
Management, but it ultimately was abandoned for a panel, rather than a
single-person, approach.40
II. Inspection Panel Procedure and Evolution
Since its inception, the Inspection Panel's role has been to address the
concerns of those who are "affected by Bank projects and to ensure that the
Bank adheres to its operational policies and procedures in the design, prep-
aration, and implementation of such projects." 4 1 In theory, the Panel ful-
and the findings of the Morse Commission, "serious consideration should be given to
establishing a permanent, independent commission for investigating public concerns
about Bank-financed projects." Id. (citing Letter from Patrick Leahy, Senator, U.S. Con-
gress, to Lewis Preston, President, World Bank (June 7, 1993)).
36. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 22-23. A substantially modified conditional IDA pro-
posal was incorporated into appropriation legislation after the establishment of the
Panel in October 1993. Id.
37. Id. at 18-19 & n. 40 (citing The Case for a World Bank Ombudsman: Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Dev., Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the H. Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Daniel Bradlow) and The
Need for a World Bank Ombudsman: Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Financial Institutions of
the Canadian H. of Commons Standing Comm. on Finance (1993) (statement of Daniel
Bradlow)); see also Bradlow, supra note 22, at 568-69 (outlining his ombudsman
proposal).
38. Daniel Bradlow, Why the World Bank Needs an Ombudsman, FIN. TIMES, July 14,
1993, at 13. In his article, Bradlow provides more information about the specific duties
and functions that should be associated with the ombudsperson position. See id.
39. Bradlow, supra note 22, at 568-69.
40. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 19.
41. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 3. See generally SHIHATA, supra
note 22, at 88-93 (discussing the history of decisions relating to the Panel's composi-
tion). The World Bank annually lends between U.S. $15 to $20 billion "for projects
in the more than 100 countries it works with"). The World Bank, Projects and Opera-
tions, The Project Cycle, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,
contentMDK:20120731-menuPK:41390-pagePK:41367-piPK:51533-theSitePK:40941,
00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). The Bank has identified seven phases of the project
cycle. First, the Bank "works with a borrowing country's government ... to determine
how financial and other assistance can . . . have the largest impact." Id. During this
stage, the Bank focuses on strategies for reducing poverty and raising the standard of
living. Id. Second, the Bank takes an advisory role in the project preparation and
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fills its role by providing an independent forum where those harmed by a
World Bank-financed project can complain. 42 Panel-member Werner Kiene
has stated that the Inspection Panel differs from many accountability and
recourse mechanisms. In his view, the Panel represents a shift in develop-
ment paradigms-it is a mechanism of "development-by-below," whereby
beneficiaries of Bank policies are able to demand responses to problems
themselves.4 3 Although the Inspection Panel has increased the World
Bank's accountability, critics have pointed to various flaws that limit the
Panel's effectiveness.
44
A. The 1993 Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel
Pursuant to the 1993 Resolution that established the Inspection Panel,
the Panel is composed of a group of "three members of different nationali-
ties from Bank member countries. '4 5 The President of the World Bank
nominates these members, and the Bank's Executive Directors ultimately
appoint them.4 6 In an effort to help maintain the Panel's independence
from the larger Bank, anyone who has worked as Bank staff in the two
years prior is prohibited from serving on the Panel.4 7 Moreover, once hav-
assesses the social, financial, and environmental aspects of the project. Id. Third, the
Bank "confirms that all aspects of the project are consistent with all World Bank opera-
tions requirements and that the government has institutional arrangements in place to
implement the project efficiently." Id. Creation of a timetable and public disclosure of
documents is also completed at this stage. Id. Fourth, after the Bank and Borrower
agree on the terms of the loan or credit, the Project Appraisal Document and all other
legal and financial documents are submitted to the Executive Directors of the Bank for
approval. Id. Fifth, the Borrower implements the project, utilizing a competitive bidding
process to issue contracts. Id. The Bank periodically supervises and reviews the project
to ensure that the Borrower is using the loan for its intended purpose. Id. Sixth, the
performance of both the Bank and the Borrower are evaluated via the "Implementation
Completion Report." Id. Finally, the Bank's Independent Operation Evaluation Depart-
ment prepares an audit report and evaluates the project. Id.
42. THE INSPECTION PANEL, THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 1, 2005 TO JUNE
30, 2006 13 (2006) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006], available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/ 10/05/0000
11823_20061005134516/Rendered/PDF/375930PAPEROIP1eport00510601PUBLIC 1.
pdf.
43. Werner Kiene, Member, World Bank Inspection Panel, Lecture at the University
of Illinois Center for Global Studies: Accountability and Compliance: New Institutions
for Helping the Poor Get What They Are Supposed to Get (Mar. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.cgs.uiuc.edu/resources/webvideo/; see also Ellen Hey, The World Bank
Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New Legally Relevant Relationship in Interna-
tional Law, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 61, 62 (1997) (arguing that the development of
the Panel evidences a new notion that the relationship between an individual or a group
and an international organization is "directly relevant in law").
44. See discussion infra Part III.
45. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev. & Int'l Dev. Ass'n, Resolution: The World
Bank Inspection Panel, ' 2, No. IBRD 93-10 and IDA 93-6 (Sept. 22, 1993) [hereinafter
Inspection Panel Resolution], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXT
INSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ResolutionMarch2005.pdf (establishing the Inspection
Panel).
46. Id.
47. Id. 9 5. When considering who will serve on the Inspection Panel, the President
and the Executive Board consider many characteristics, including the members' "ability
Vol. 41
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ing served on the Panel, Panel members cannot work for the Bank again. 48
The 1993 Resolution also sets forth the basic criteria by which the
Board expects the Panel to operate. 49 Although the method of operation
has not changed substantially since the Panel's foundation in 1993, there
have been important changes to the manner in which the Board approves
Panel requests to investigate. The Bank's Board made these changes
through the 1996 and 1999 Clarifications, 50 thereby turning the Panel into
a more regular, if not yet fully accepted, part of the Bank's structure.
B. Standing to Bring Request Review Before the Panel
The Panel's operating procedures explicitly limit access to the Panel
via standing requirements. 5 1 First, the procedures authorize complaints
only from a "group" of people, not an individual.5 2 The 1996 Clarification
defines a group as "any two or more persons who share some common
interests or concerns. '5 3 Second, the group must claim that "an action or
omission of the Bank ... to follow its own operational policies and proce-
dures during the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a Bank-
financed project"-which includes both project lending and development-
policy lending5 4 -will have an "actual or threatened material adverse effect
to deal thoroughly and fairly" with requests that individuals bring to them, "their integ-
rity and their independence from the Bank's Management," their experience with inter-
national development issues, and their understanding of the Bank's general operations.
INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 5. While the Panel's chair typically
works on a full-time basis and the other two members work part-time, the Board can
employ all of the members on a full-time basis should the need arise. Inspection Panel
Resolution, supra note 45, cl 9.
48. THE INSPECTION PANEL, THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT: AUGUST 1, 2001 TO
JUNE 30, 2002 6 (2002) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002], available at http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/ 11/01/
000094946_02102204203245/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
49. See generally Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45.
50. See generally THE INSPECTION PANEL, THE WORLD BANK, REVIEW OF THE RESOLUTION
ESTABLISHING THE INSPECTION PANEL: 1996 CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE RESO-
LUTION (1996) [hereinafter 1996 CLARIFICATION], available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/1996ReviewResolution.pdf; THE INSPEC-
TION PANEL, THE WORLD BANK, 1999 CLARIFICATION OF THE BOARD'S SECOND REVIEW OF
THE INSPECTION PANEL (1999) [hereinafter 1999 CLARIFICATIONS], available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ 1999Clarificationofthe
Board.pdf. For additional information see also INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra
note 7, at 12-13, 140-45 (providing context for the 1996 and 1999 Clarifications to the
Panel's original mandate and reproducing the text of those clarifications); The Inspec-
tion Panel, The World Bank, Operating Procedure, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/ EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK: 20175161 - isCURL :Y - menuPK:
64129254-pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Inspection Panel Operating Procedure] (containing the oper-
ating procedures adopted by the Panel on Aug. 19, 1994).
51. See Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, l 12; Inspection Panel Operating
Procedures, supra note 50, at Part lI.3.A.4(a)-(d). See generally SHIHATA, supra note 22,
at 55-70.
52. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, J 12.
53. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note 50, at 1.
54. The Inspection Panel has addressed three claims related to development policy
lending: (1) Bangladesh Jute Sector Adjustment Credit in 1996, (2) Argentina Special
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on the group's rights or interests. '5 5 In other words, there must be a clear
connection between the harm that the affected people are suffering, or are
about to suffer, and the Bank's policy.
For example, in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in South Africa
the Inspection Panel refused to recommend remedial measures because of a
lack of causation. 56 In that case, the claimants complaint to the Inspection
Panel stated that African townships were going to suffer a "dramatic
increase in water prices for what was Africa's largest-ever dam project," and
that the "[Blank's technical advice to the South African government[]
resulted in a distortion of water management policies and placed a dispro-
portionate cost on poor townships."5 7 The Inspection Panel did not recom-
mend an investigation, however, because "there [did] not appear to be a
connection between these conditions and any observance or not by the
Bank of its own policies and procedures. Rather, they appear to be a part
of the enormous legacy and odious burden of apartheid. '58
Third, even if the Requester can satisfy this requirement, before filing
such a claim the Requester is required to take steps "to bring the matter to
the attention of [Bank] Management with a result unsatisfactory to the
Requester." 59 The Panel has indicated that "[i]t is useful, if possible, for
Requesters to attach copies of any correspondence between affected people
and the Bank to demonstrate that steps had been previously taken to try to
get complaints resolved." 60
Parties other than the affected parties are authorized to file claims with
the Inspection Panel as well. For example, any one of the Bank's Executive
Structural Adjustment Loan in 1999, and (3) Papua-New Guinea Governance Promotion
Adjustment Loan in 2001. The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Requests by Request
Number, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,
contentMDK:20221606-menuPK:64129250-pagePK:64129751 -piPK:64128378-theSite
PK:380794,00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). At the time, development policy lending
was referred to as adjustment lending. See Press Release, The World Bank, Development
Policy Lending Replaces Adjustment Lending: The World Bank Overhauls Its Guidelines
For Policy-Based Lending to Reflect 20 Years of Experience (Aug. 10, 2004), available
at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20237378-
menuPK:34457-pagePK:64003015-piPK:64003012-theSitePK:4607,00.html.
55. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 512.
56. See Kay Treakle et al., Lessons Learned, in DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SocI-
ETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 247, 267-68 (Dana Clark, Jonathan
Fox & Kay Treakle eds., 2003).
57. Id.; Anonymous Letter to The Inspection Panel, The World Bank (Apr. 23, 1998),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/
lesothorequestforinspection.pdf (requesting inspection of the Lesotho Highlands Water
Project).
58. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 268 (citing The Inspection Panel, The World Bank,
Report and Recommendation on Requestfor Inspection, Lesotho/South Africa: Lesotho High-
lands Water Project, at 19, IPN Request RQ98/2 (Aug. 18, 1998), available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/LesotholEligibility.pd).
59. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 512; Clark, supra note 9, at 218 ("The
Panel is intended to be a forum of last resort, and local people must first exhaust other
remedies by raising their concerns with the Bank prior to filing a claim.").
60. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 7.
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Directors may request an investigation. 6 1 The procedures also authorize
local or foreign representatives, such as NGOs, acting on the explicit
instructions of affected people to bring requests to the Panel.6 2 In the case
of foreign representation, however, "the Panel will require clear evidence
that there is no adequate or appropriate representation in the country
where the project is located." 63 According to Panel procedures, the circum-
stances warranting non-local representation must be "exceptional. '64 This
requirement emerged as a compromise between NGOs in developed coun-
tries that wanted to represent affected peoples in foreign nations and bor-
rowing-country governments that "feared intervention of foreign parties" in
their relationships with their citizens and "the increased politicization and
internationalization of their domestic issues." 65
Notably, the Board is ultimately charged with determining whether
exceptional circumstances exist.6 6 As one scholar has pointed out, vesting
ultimate authority to make this determination with the Board undermines
the independent nature of the Panel.6 7 The Executive Directors can be
"politically motivated" in their role as policymakers for the institution and
thus should not be authorized to make an eligibility determination under a
system that is purportedly independent from the Bank.68
In the history of the Inspection Panel, there has only been one
instance in which the Board has permitted wholly non-local representa-
tion: the China Western Poverty Reduction Project.69 When this project
was first implemented, people in the affected area feared they would be
harmed if they spoke against it 70 and instead sent letters to an NGO in
Washington, D.C., the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), with the
aim of "seeking international assistance in raising concerns about the dev-
astating impacts of th[e] project on local peoples. '' 7 1 The Tibetan Govern-
61. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 514.
64. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 12; see also DANA L. CLARK, CTR. FOR
INT'L ENVTL. LAW, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 10 (2d ed.
1999) (stating that exceptional circumstances "could include countries where local
NGOs are not allowed to operate or where there is a risk of retaliation").
65. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 65.
66. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 517 ("The Board decides whether or not
to accept or reject the Panel's recommendation; and, if the Requester is a non-local repre-
sentative, whether exceptional circumstances exist and suitable local representation is
not available.").
67. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 218-19.
68. Stefanie Ricarda Roos, The World Bank Inspection Panel in its Seventh Year: An
Analysis of its Process, Mandate, and Desirability with Special Reference to the China (Tibet)
Case, in 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. LAW 473, 486-87 (.A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum eds.,
2001), available at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/roos-5.pdf.
69. For a copy of the request for inspection that the International Campaign for
Tibet filed on behalf of the affected persons, see Int'l Campaign for Tibet, China W.
Poverty Reduction Project, Request for Inspection, June 18, 1999 [hereinafter ICT
Request], available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1571.
70. CLARK, supra note 64, at 18.
71. Letter from Jim MacNeill, Chairman, Inspection Panel, to John Ackerly, Presi-
dent, Bhuchung Tsering, Dir., Int'l Campaign for Tibet (June 18, 1999), available at
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ment in Exile also sought ICT's help in filing a claim with the Panel. 72
In its request for inspection on behalf of the affected persons, the ICT
included an annex detailing the basis for its representational authority. 73
ICT claimed that the "exceptional" threshold had been met because "local
people affected by the . . . [p]roject [were] unlikely to access ... informa-
tion about the existence of the Inspection Panel, or to have access to NGOs
in their country who would be able to provide documentation about the
existence of the Panel or the Bank's policies and procedures." 74 Even
assuming the presence of NGOs, however, the ICT argued that no one in
Tibet could "safely bring a claim" because of the Chinese's treatment of
dissidents. 75 Ultimately, the Board never commented upon ICT's eligibility
and the Panel's request for a determination of the issue, but it did authorize
an inspection. 76
The operating procedures outline the precise requirements for what a
Requester must include in the request to the Panel. Generally, the
Requester must include a description of the project at issue, "an explana-
tion of how Bank policies, procedures or contractual documents were seri-
ously violated," the harm that the party suffered, and what steps the
Requester has already taken to resolve the issue with the Bank.7 7 If the
party is not sure what policies apply, the Panel will identify what policies,
if any, are implicated "[oln the basis of the factual situation and elements
of harm presented. '78 The Panel provides a model form for those who
wish to request inspection, although a simple letter with all of the relevant
information is also sufficient. 79
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ChinaNOR.pdf
(outlining the International Campaign for Tibet's claim that "[gliven the location of this
project and the situation faced by local people, this claim meets the exceptional circum-
stances requirement for non-local representation").
72. Id.
73. ICT Request, supra note 69, at Annex Bi (detailing the extensive involvement
and presence that ICT had in the affected area and excerpting, as part of its plea for
representational authority, letters that the ICT had received from people living in the
area).
74. Id. (citing a U.S. Department of State report's conclusion that there are "no inde-
pendent domestic NGO's that publicly monitor or comment on human rights
conditions").
75. Id. at Annex B2 ("The most dangerous consequence to local peoples is of impris-
onment and harsh treatment in imprisonment. Less obvious, but more common risks
include interference in a complainant's or suspected complainant's ability to maintain
housing, livelihood, education and medical services.").
76. See Roos, supra note 68, at 490 (quoting the Board's determination that resolu-
tion of the eligibility issue would "likely delay investigation" and proposing that the
Panel proceed to investigation without a resolution of whether ICT met the standard); see
also The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Investigation Report, Qinghai Project: A Com-
ponent of the China: Western Poverty Reduction Project, at 8-9, IPN Request RQ99/3 (Apr.
28, 2000), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/
Resources/CHINA-InvestigationReport.pdf.
77. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513.
78. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 7.
79. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 513-14; see also INSPECTION PANEL 10
YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 161-62 (reproducing the Panel's model form). The Office of
the Inspection Panel is also available to consult with people interested in making a
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C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
There are limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the Inspec-
tion Panel. Its procedures only empower the Panel to review Bank compli-
ance with its 1) operational policies, which "establish the parameters for
the conduct of operations [and] also describe the circumstances under
which exceptions to policies are permissible and ... who authorizes excep-
tions;" 2) bank procedures, which "explain how Bank staff carry out the
policies set out in the [operating procedures] by spelling out the proce-
dures and documentation required to ensure Bank wide consistency and
quality;" and 3) operational directives, which "contain a mixture of poli-
cies, procedures, and guidance."80
The Panel is not authorized to investigate Bank compliance regarding
actions of "other parties (such as the borrowing government, the imple-
menting agency, a corporation, the [International Finance Corporation,]
IFC, or the [Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,] MIGA)." 8 1 Also
precluded from Panel review are "[c]laims by actual or potential suppliers
of products or services" and "[clomplaints filed after the closing date of the
loan," or when less than 5% of the loan is outstanding. 82 The claim is also
precluded if the Panel has already inquired into a matter on a previous
request, unless the Requester is able to show that there is new evidence or
new circumstances surrounding the issue.8 3 For example, the Panel
rejected a request for investigation based on eligibility in the Request for
Inspection of the Public Works and Employment Creation Project in
Burundi. The Requesters complained about the "lack of due process for
procurement of services in a Project-related concession agreement," but the
claim was not eligible for inspection because it related to procurement.8 4
request if that person needs advice on preparing or submitting a request. Operating
Procedures, supra note 1, at 514.
80. Namita Wahi, Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank: A Cri-
tique of Existing Mechanisms and Articulation of a Theory of Horizontal Accountability, 12
U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 331, 352-53 (2006); see also Operating Procedures, supra
note 1, at 512.
81. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9. See generally CAO GUIDELINES,
supra note 14 (describing the IFC and MIGA).
82. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9. In addition to potentially
reducing the number of projects that would be subject to the Inspection Panel's jurisdic-
tion, the Bank's directors advocated for a disbursement limitation as a way to ensure that
the Panel would not have the power to review matters "falling within the purview of the
Banks Operations Evaluation Department," which is now known as the Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG). SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 52 n.52. The IEG's purpose is to
assess "what works, and what does not; how a borrower plans to run and maintain a
project; and the lasting contribution of the Bank to a country's overall development."
Indep. Evaluation Group, The World Bank, About IEG, http://www.worldbank.org/oed/
about.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
83. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9.
84. THE INSPECTION PANEL, THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 1, 2004 TO JUNE
30, 2005 24 (2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTION
PANEL/Resources/IPN-2004-2005.pdf.
589
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D. The Panel's Action on a Request
Once the Panel receives a request, the "process can be ... divided into
three stages: registration, eligibility, and investigation. ' 85 During the regis-
tration component, the Panel makes the Bank and the public aware that a
Requester has filed a complaint and completes a quick review to ensure
that the group has standing and that the Panel has jurisdiction over the
claim.86 The Panel's operating procedures do not provide a specific time-
line within which this registration review must take place, but they do
require that the Panel "promptly register the Request, or ask for additional
information, or find the Request outside the Panel's mandate. '8 7 For the
most recent requests that the Panel receives, the complaints are registered
within a week. 88 The Panel views this first step as an "administrative" one,
the primary purpose of which is to prevent "complaints that are obviously
outside its mandate, that are anonymous, or that are manifestly
frivolous." 89
Generally, whether or not the Panel can register the request is fairly
clear. For example, in 1995, the Inspection Panel refused to register a
request filed by a number of Chilean citizens and a Chilean NGO. 90 The
Requesters claimed that the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a
part of the bank that provides loans to private companies, 9 1 "had violated
[the Bank's] relevant policies regarding indigenous peoples and environ-
mental assessment and failed to supervise properly the implementation of
the project. '"92 The Inspection Panel concluded, however, that its mandate
clearly limited its investigatory powers to projects under the IBRD and the
IDA. Because the Panel did not have power over IFC projects, it refused to
85. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 8.
86. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 514-15; INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON,
supra note 7, at 9.
87. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 514.
88. The Inspection Panel, Inspection Panel Register, Country: Ghana, Second Urban
Environment Santiation Project (USP II), Request No. RQ07/06 (2007), available at http:
//siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/RegisterGhanaUES
PII.pdf (indicating that the request was filed on August 16, 2007 and registered on
August 22, 2007); The Inspection Panel, Inspection Panel Register, Country: Albania,
Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project, Request No. RQ07/03 (2007), availa-
ble at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/Register
AlbaniaPower.pdf (showing that the request was filed on April 30, 2007 and the request
was registered on May 2, 2007).
89. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 8.
90. The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Chile: Financing of Hydroelectric Dams in
the Bfo Bio River (1995) (1995) [hereinafter Chile Financing], available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/Chile-Biobio.pdf (stating
that the Request was not registered because the project was not financed by the IBRD or
the IDA).
91. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 33-34 (stating that in the Board discussion of the
draft Resolution, Executive Directors suggested the IFC should be included in the Panel's
work but that the question of whether the Resolution's application may be extended to
cover the IFC's operation is an issue still under consideration).
92. Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law, Proposed IFC/MIGA Inspection Panel, http://www.ciel.
org/Ifi/ifc.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
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investigate. 9 3
Once a claim is registered, the eligibility phase begins, and the Panel
forwards the complaint to the Bank's President. The Bank's Management,
through the Bank's President, must respond to the Panel's inquiry within
twenty-one business days,94 providing evidence that the Bank "has com-
plied, or intends to comply with the Bank's relevant polices and proce-
dures."9 5 When the Panel receives Management's response, it has another
twenty-one business days to evaluate whether Management has truly reme-
died, or intends to remedy, the problem.9 6
One factor that the Panel may consider when deciding whether to rec-
ommend an investigation is whether Management "dealt appropriately
with the subject matter of the request... [and] demonstrated clearly that it
has followed the required policies and procedures." 97 If so, then this may
weigh in favor of recommending no further action.98 Yet, in instances
where Management and the Requester cannot easily reconcile their views
regarding the Bank's compliance with its policies and/or the source of the
alleged harm, the Panel may choose to recommend an investigation.9 9
Additionally, it is expected that if Management admits that it failed to fol-
low the Bank's policies, in its response to the claim it should propose
"remedial actions and a timetable for implementing them."'10 0
However, the decision whether to recommend an investigation is not
just based on the request and Management's response. The Panel also has
the power to conduct a preliminary study, which may entail a visit to the
93. Chile Financing, supra note 90 (stating that the Request was not registered
because the project was not financed by the IBRD or the IDA). Out of the forty-nine
requests for inspection thus far, the Inspection Panel has refused to register five of them.
The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Requests by Request Number, http://web.world
bank. org/ WBSITE/ EXTERNAL /EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/ 0,,contentMDK:20221606 -
menuPK:64129250-pagePK:64129751 -piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2008) (listing all of the requests, including the non-registered ones from
Burundi, Cameroon, India, Chile, and Ethiopia).
94. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 515.
95. Id.
96. Id. (noting that the Panel may request further information from Management "to
make an informed recommendation" regarding whether to investigate). In general, the
Panel must "decide whether [the request] is based on an alleged failure by the Bank
related to its own policies and procedures, and whether any alleged consequent harm
complained of appears material enough to warrant investigation." INSPECTION PANEL 10
YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 9.
97. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 516.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Report and Recommendation on
Request for Inspection, Pakistan, National Drainage Program Project, at 24, Report No.
30704 (Nov. 17, 2004) available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPEC
TIONPANEL/Resources/EligibilityReport.pdf ("[T]he differing views on the issues
raised by the Request cannot be easily reconciled and ... they involve conflicting asser-
tions and interpretations about the issues, the facts, and compliance with Bank policies
and procedures. The Panel believes that these important questions .. .as well as the
proximate causes of the alleged harm . .. can only be addressed in the context of a Panel
investigation.").
100. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 10; see also Operating Proce-
dures, supra note 1, at 516.
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project site. 10 1 Although this preliminary evaluation is not required, 10 2 the
idea behind such a visit is to ensure that the Panel makes "an informed
recommendation about an investigation to the Board."' 0 3 Even if the Panel
chooses to conduct an in-country preliminary study, the eligibility evalua-
tion process must occur completely within the twenty-one days following
the receipt of the President's response to the complaint's initial registra-
tion.10 4 Only in "circumstances outside the control of the Panel or Man-
agement" is the timeline waived.' 05 In addition to a substantive inquiry
into the merits of the compliant, during this phase the Panel conducts a
more thorough review of the eligibility of the Requesters themselves. 10 6
Thus, after reviewing the claimant's request, Management's response,
information from third parties, and any preliminary findings, 10 7 the Panel
will make a recommendation to the Board indicating "whether the matter
should be investigated" more thoroughly. 10 8 This recommendation is
referred to as the Eligibility Report.
Under the Resolution establishing the Panel, only the Board had the
power to officially authorize the Panel to proceed with an investigation. 10 9
After the 1999 Clarifications, which were developed in response to the crit-
icisms of the Working Group on the Second Review of the Inspection Panel,
the Board agreed (except for in limited circumstances) to authorize investi-
gations on a no-objection basis. 1 10
101. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 516.
102. 1999 CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 50, 1 11.
103. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 10.
104. Id.
105. Id. ("The time limit has not been applied twice for country internal political
reasons.").
106. Id. at 9 ("[Tjhe Panel needs to establish whether the Requesters are who they say
they are, live in the project area in the borrower's territory, and are a community of
people sharing some common interests or concerns.").
107. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 516.
108. Id. at 517.
109. Id. at 516 ("The Board decides whether or not to accept or reject the Panel's
recommendation; and, if the Requester is a non-local representative, whether exceptional
circumstances exist and suitable local representation is not available.").
110. 1999 CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 50, 111 8-9 ("If the Panel so recommends, the
Board will authorize an investigation without making a judgment on the merits of the
claimants' request, and without discussion except with respect to .. . technical eligibility
criteria."); Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 257 ("In every case since the second review,
[the] board members have approved panel recommendations for investigations."). There
were significant problems with the manner in which the Board authorized, and fre-
quently, failed to authorize, investigations prior to the establishment of the no-objection
approval. First, "the Panel's preliminary assessment reports," upon which the Board
based its decision about whether to authorize an investigation, "gave rise to lengthy
Board discussions on the substance of the complaints, which were inappropriate before
the results of an investigation." INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 13.
Furthermore, because of the Board's tendency to engage in in-depth discussions about
whether to authorize an investigation, Management often submitted action plans for
Board consideration in its investigation decision. Id. at 12. However, "a fundamental
problem with having an Action Plan at this stage was that the plan could not be based on
the findings of a full, independent investigation." Id. Because Management's proposals
were often appealing in the absence of countervailing information that could only be
obtained through an investigation, the Board often approved these plans and required no
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The Panel ostensibly begins investigating soon after the Board's
approval of the Panel's investigation request; however, no specific timeline
is included in the operating procedures."' Panel investigations typically
consist of visits to the project site, interviews with the affected people or
their representatives, and conversations with government officials and the
authorities in charge of the project.'12 The Panel also interviews Bank staff
and Management.113 All of these conversations are supposed to remain
confidential, and "the 1999 Clarifications stress the need for the Panel to
keep the profile of its in-country activities low and to make it clear that the
Panel is investigating the Bank (not the borrower)." 1 14 The Panel may also
hire outside consultants who are recognized specialists in the subject areas
related to the Requesters' claim. 1 15
After ruling on whether the Bank is in compliance with its policies and
procedures, the Inspection Panel submits its findings to the Bank's Manage-
ment and the Board. 1 16 The Panel does not propose remedial measures
1 7
and "does not have the power to issue an injunction, stop a project, or
award financial compensation for harm suffered." 118 The Bank's Manage-
ment reviews the Panel's findings and must submit a response to the Board
within six weeks.1 19 If it chooses to do so, Management is able to make
remedial recommendations in this report. 120 The Bank officially refers to
these reports as "compliance plans"-although they have also been referred
further investigatory action by the Panel. Id. As a result, the Board failed to recommend
investigations in cases where it was likely needed. Id. at 12-13. Ensuring that the Panel
has more control over what it investigates would help to secure the independence of that
body.
111. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 517 (indicating that upon approval the
Panel's Chair shall move "promptly" to start the investigatory procedures).
112. Id. at 517-18; see also INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 14.
113. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 14.
114. Id.; see also 1999 CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 50, 1 12.
115. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 518. In the case of Inspection Panel
Request Number 31: Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage, and Environmental Manage-
ment Project, the Inspection Panel hired six "internationally recognized specialists in
environmental assessment, hydrology, marine outfalls, indigenous peoples, and eco-
nomic analysis and financial issues." ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 46.
In the case of the Panel's investigation into the Qinghai Project, which was part of the
China Western Poverty Reduction Project, Robert Hunter Wade, Professor of Political
Economy, London School of Economics, served as a consultant. Robert Hunter Wade,
Tighter IMF Accountability? Some Dangers, in ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 111 nn.45 & 49 (Barry Carin & Angela Wood eds., 2005).
116. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 518 (outlining the requirements for the
Panel's report).
117. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, '1 22 ("The report of the Panel shall
consider all relevant facts, and shall conclude with the Panel's findings on whether the
Bank has complied with all relevant Bank policies and procedures."); INSPECTION PANEL
10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 14.
118. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 258.
119. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, ' 23; Operating Procedures, supra
note 1, at 518-19; SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 85-86.
120. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 14-15 ("Consistent with normal
operating procedures, Bank Management, when it responds to the Panel's Investigation
Report, recommends, when relevant, remedial actions to the Board.").
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to as "action plans.' 12 1 The plans describe "the measures [that Manage-
ment] intends to adopt to address the problems of non-compliance of the
project expressed in the Panel's report."'122
The Board reviews the Panel's findings in conjunction with Manage-
ment's recommendations. 123 Although the Board is empowered to "ask the
Panel to check whether Management has made appropriate consultations
about [any proposed] remedial measures with affected people, . . . the
Board has not done so as of 2003."124 The Board is then required to con-
tact the initial Requester within two weeks of considering the Panel's report
and Management's response, informing him or her of the investigation's
results and "the action decided by the Executive Directors, if any."'1 25
The length of a Panel investigation varies greatly-from a number of
months to over a year-and there is no timeline set forth in the Panel Reso-
lution or its operating procedures. 126 For example, with respect to the
Panel's investigation into a number of dam projects in Uganda, the Panel
registered the request on August 7, 2001,127 requested permission to inves-
tigate on October 26, 2001,128 and finally sent its report to the Board on
May 23, 2002.129 Management responded to the Panel's investigation on
June 7, 2002, and the Board met to consider both reports on June 17, 2002,
approving Management's findings with regard to the Panel's
investigation. 130
III. Criticisms of the Inspection Panel
Each year the demand for the Panel's attention increases, with July 1,
2006 to June 30, 2007 as the Panel's busiest year to date.1 3 ' During that
121. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 189 (drawing a distinction between remedial "Action
Plans," which are agreements between the Bank and the Borrower, and "Compliance
Plans," which are solely related to the Bank). Although the term "remedial action plan"
technically refers to an agreement by both the Bank and the borrower, the academic
literature often also refers to compliance plans as "action plans." See, e.g., Mariarita
Circi, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Is it Really Effective?, GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES,
2006, at 9, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 182&con
text=gj.
122. Circi, supra note 121, at 9.
123. INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 15.
124. Id.
125. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 519.
126. Id. at 514; see also SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 82 ("Except for [certain] safeguards
outlined below, the Resolution is silent on the matter in which investigation will be
carried out, leaving this matter to the discretion of the Panel.").
127. The Inspection Panel, The Inspection Panel Register, Country: Uganda, Project:
Third Power Project, Request No. RQ 01/3 (2002) [hereinafter Uganda Project Request],
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/
UgandaRegister.pdf.
128. ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002, supra note 48, at 13.
129. Uganda Project Request, supra note 127.
130. ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002, supra note 48, at 16-17. Ultimately, this project
was delayed due to corruption scandals. Treakle et al., supra note 56, 265 tbl. 11.5.
131. THE INSPECTION PANEL, THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 1, 2006 TO JUNE
30, 2007 13 (2007) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007], available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/11/28/0000
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time, "the Panel registered six new Requests for Inspection."' 13 2 It also
"completed two investigations" and worked on "three other investigations,
one of which [was] nearly complete."'13 3 The previous fiscal year was also a
busy one, as the Panel approved two out of four investigative requests from
affected persons, deferred a third request, 13 4 investigated five complaints
concurrently, and submitted a number of reports to the Bank's Executive
Board determining Bank compliance with its policies and procedures in
pending complaints. 135
Despite the increasing use of the Panel's procedures, there are numer-
ous criticisms of the Panel's work, and critics often question whether the
Panel truly increases the World Bank's accountability. 136 According to
these critics, the Panel is not an adequate accountability mechanism
because it has a limited mandate, 13 7 a limited ability to grant relief,138 and
generally lacks the independence from the Bank necessary to make it a
wholly effective institution. 139
A. Panel's Inability to Grant Relief
The inability of the Panel to grant relief is one of the most-cited
problems with the Inspection Panel. 140 First, the Panel has very limited
authority to recommend any type of remedial measure to the Bank-the
Panel is not a problem-solving entity, and under its operating procedures it
is expected to opine solely on whether the Bank complied with its own
policies. 14 1 It also follows, then, that the Panel has no authority to provide
20953 20071128120537/Rendered/PDF/416020PAPEROInlnnua11Report01PUBLC 1.
pdf.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 13. The final investigative request
was not approved because the Requesters asked the Panel to defer the decision for six
months because some of the issues were being addressed. Id.
135. Id. at 13-14.
136. See Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 269-73; see also SHIHATA, supra note 22, at
237-40 (espousing a more optimistic view of the Panel's effect on the World Bank's
accountability, but noting that the Panel cannot unilaterally provide legal remedies).
137. See Wahi, supra note 80, at 357.
138. Id. at 359; see also Dana Clark, Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel, in
DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION
PANEL, supra note 56, at 1, 13-19 [hereinafter Understanding the Inspection Panel]. See
generally Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complainants and International Organizations: A
Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial
Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 403 (2005) (conducting a comparison of existing inde-
pendent inspection entities and then proposing an ideal mechanism based on the
strengths of those surveyed).
139. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 258, 266 ("[W]hile the panel's investigations (or
reviews) have often confirmed that the harm was caused by bank policy violations, the
solutions (action plans) have been proposed by management, which is also responsible
for their implementation. This means the same bank officials-whose actions or omis-
sions may have caused the claimants' problems-are tasked with resolving the very
problems that they have caused."). But see SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 204-19 (attempt-
ing to rebut fears about the Panel's lack of independence).
140. See discussion supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
141. Wahi, supra note 80, at 359-60.
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compensation to affected communities.14 2 Furthermore, just as the Panel
is generally precluded from proposing and providing remedies, 143 so are
the affected parties who initiated the investigatory process in the first
place. 144
Because the Panel is unable to provide relief, both the Panel and
affected communities often look to Management for aid.14 5 The Bank does
have a limited ability to provide injunctive relief, but its power to halt a
project depends on the- stage of the project. 146 Board authorization for an
inspection of a project that has not yet begun does not automatically mean
that the Bank also intends the preparatory work on the project to cease. 14 7
If the Bank does so intend, however, Management has the power "to sus-
pend the Bank's preparatory work, or the Board may request it to do so
pending the outcome of inspection in cases where the prevailing circum-
stances require such a measure."' 1 48 Furthermore, "[tihe Panel ...may
also indicate whether . . .suspension of preparatory work ... would be
needed for the purpose of its inspection (if, for example, the continuation
of such work would have the potential of making the alleged harm irrevers-
ible)."'149 This tactic appears to be little used, although Dana Clark has
indicated that it could have been invoked in the National Thermal Power
Corporation's (NTPC) Power Generation Project in Singrauli, India, to halt
the "forced eviction" of villagers from the project area before the inspection
could take place.
1 5 0
The Bank also has the power to grant injunctive-type relief by halting
or cancelling loan disbursement. 1 5 1  As a general matter, because the
financial demands to complete a project without the Bank's support are
prohibitively high, an order to stop disbursement functions as the
142. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 258.
143. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 1 22 ("The report of the Panel shall
consider all relevant facts, and shall conclude with the Panel's findings on whether the
Bank has complied with all relevant Bank policies and procedures."); INSPECTION PANEL
10 YEARS ON, supra note 7, at 14.
144. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267 (citing Letter from Madhu Kohli to Ernst
Gunther Br6der, Inspection Panel, The World Bank (Sept. 24, 1997)).
145. Id. at 258 (stating that it is up to the board to announce whether remedial mea-
sures will be undertaken).
146. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 81 ("A decision by the Board authorizing inspection
'normally would not involve cessation of preparatory work on an operation .... '" (quot-
ing Memorandum from the President to the Board of Directors, Operations Inspection
Function: Objectives, Mandate, and Operating Procedures for an Independent Inspec-
tion Panel, R93-122/2 (Sept. 10, 1993))).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Dana Clark, Singrauli: An Unfulfilled Struggle for Justice, in DEMANDING ACCOUNT-
ABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK, supra note 56, at 176 & 188 n.46.
151. See Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., General Conditions for Loans, § 7.02
Uuly 1, 2005) (as amended through Sept. 1, 2007) [hereinafter General Conditions],
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPGENCON/Resources/IBRD-GC
.05-Rev7.pdf; Int'l Dev. Ass'n, General Conditions for Credits and Grants, § 6.02 (July 1,
2005) (as amended through Oct. 1, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1173795340221/IDAGCO5.pdf.
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equivalent of an order to halt the entire project. 152 Only one Inspection
Panel case appears to support the notion that countries are free to engage
in development projects absent Bank funding. 153 Professor Philip Alston
has also pointed out that India, which "by the standards of most develop-
ing countries ... is less in hock to the international community than
most," has "rejected unacceptable World Bank loan conditions, and told
the Bank in no uncertain terms to keep its money."' 15 4 As recently as 2006,
however, the Bank suspended disbursements on the road and resettlement
components of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project in India and instead
of proceeding on its own, the "State of Maharashtra agreed to a [Bank-
imposed] ten condition strategy for lifting the suspension of
disbursements." 15 5
It is not the Bank's practice, however, to provide compensation for
harms that the Inspection Panel identifies. Consequently, an increased
ability for the Panel and the Bank to grant relief-both injunctive and com-
pensatory-to parties affected by the Bank's failure to follow its own poli-
cies and procedures would dramatically increase the effectiveness of the
Panel and its responsiveness to claimant communities.
B. The Bank's Failure to Follow Through with Remedial Plans
Not only is the Panel unable to propose relief based on its investiga-
tory findings, but the Board has "explicitly prohibited the panel from hav-
ing an oversight role in [the] management-generated action plans" that the
Bank designs as remedial responses to the problems that the Inspection
Panel uncovers. 1 56 Unfortunately, at the same time the Bank prevents
152. See NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR BOR-
ROWERS 70 (2006) ("The IMF and World Bank enjoy considerable bargaining power in
their relations with borrowing governments. Countries mostly approach the institutions
when they have little access to alternative sources of finance.").
153. See Press Release, The World Bank, China Announces Withdrawal of Loan Appli-
cation for Qinghai Component of China Western Poverty Reduction Project, http://
go.worldbank.org/NKY8VBZQ80 (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
154. Philip Alston, Remarks on Professor B.S. Chimni's A Just World Under the Law: A
View From the South, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 221, 227 (2007).
155. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 57.
156. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 266; see 1999 Clarifications, supra note 50, 31
15-16 (noting that action plans are "outside the purview" of the founding Resolution,
and the Board is unable to "ask the Panel to monitor the implementation of the action
plans"); supra notes 121-122 (defining action and compliance plans). But see THE
INSPECTION PANEL, THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 1, 2003 TO JUNE 30, 2004
42-48 (2004). When parties filed a request for inspection relating to two projects that
partially finance the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project,
The Board requested the Panel to review and assess Management's action plan
and the additional implementation measures on its behalf. After the Board meet-
ing, the Panel returned to the Project area to explain and discuss the Panel's
findings with the Requesters and the people they represent. The Panel noted its
continuing role in assessing Management's actions .... Thus, for the first time in
its ten-year history, the Panel's role in the context of a Request for Inspection has
continued after the submission of the investigation report to the Board, to help
ensure that Management follows through on its action plan and to carry forward
a dialogue with the people affected by a Bank-financed project.
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Panel oversight of these remedial plans, the Board itself, has failed to
entirely fulfill its responsibility to follow up on the proposed plans.'
5 7
For example, in the case of the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project in Argen-
tina/Paraguay, claimants filed a request for inspection asserting that the
Bank had violated its policies relating to the "environment, resettlement,
wildlands, information disclosure, indigenous peoples, and project super-
vision, among others."' 5 8 After an extremely contentious investigation, the
Inspection Panel found that the Bank had violated numerous policies and
procedures. 159 In developing its action plan in response, however, Manage-
ment did not consult with local communities and failed to publish its
action plan in Spanish so that the affected communities could understand
the outcome of the investigation. 160 Six years after the Board first consid-
ered the Panel report, "bank management had done little to follow up to
ensure that the action plans were being implemented," and the Board did
not intervene. 16 1
Another example of the Bank's neglectful attitude toward its action
plans is the Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage, and Environmental Man-
agement Project in Colombia. 16 2 There, the Bank was funding an expan-
sion of Cartagena's water and sewage system. 163 The project included the
construction of a pipeline that "would carry the untreated wastewater from
the city and discharge it into the Caribbean Sea," which was located some
two and one half kilometers from coastal fishing villages. 164 The Panel's
investigation found numerous problems with the design and the implemen-
tation of the project,16 5 so, on July 29, 2005, Management prepared an
action plan to address the Panel's report. 166 The Board addressed both the
Id. at 42, 48.
157. Clark, supra note 9, at 219-20. Ms. Clark refers to these cases as the "lost cases"
and attributes the lack of oversight to the fact that the "Board is overwhelmed with infor-
mation . . . [and] does not have a standing committee to track the implementation of
action plans or to evaluate the effectiveness of remedial measures." Id. at 220.
158. Kay Treakle & Elias Diaz Pefia, Accountability at the World Bank: What Does it
Take? Lessons from the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, Argentina/Paraguay, in DEMANDING
ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra
note 56, at 69, 74.
159. Id. at 77 (citing The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Review of Problems and
Assessment of Action Plans, Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project (Sept. 16,
1997)). This investigation was conducted prior to the "no-objection" approval require-
ment, and the Board was divided about whether to allow the investigation in the first
place. Id. at 69-77.
160. Id. at 79-80.
161. Id. at 83-84.
162. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 44-49.
163. Id. at 44.
164. Id.
165. See generally The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Investigation Report on
Colombia: Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Management Project
(Loan No. 4507-CO), Report No. 32034-CO (June 24, 2005), available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/PanellnvestigationReport
Final.pdf.
166. See Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Management Report and Recommenda-
tion in Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report" Colombia Cartagena Water
Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Management Project (Loan No. 4507-CO), Report No.
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action plan and the Panel's findings in November 2005 and approved the
action plan "with the caveat.., that Management would submit a progress
report to the Board on the execution of the Project and Action Plan within
six months." 167 Management did not submit the progress report until Sep-
tember 4, 2006-almost a full year following the meeting of the Board. 168
Management's also failed to follow up with its remedial action plans in
the Mumbai Urban Transport Project in India.16 9 In 2004, the Panel
received four separate requests for inspection stemming from this pro-
ject.1 70 The Requesters claimed that forced resettlement to construct two
road segments "would destroy their livelihoods, cause them to dismantle
their productive sources, and disperse their supporting networks and kin
groups.' 1 71 The Requesters also complained, among other things, about
the quality of the replacement structures in the relocations sites.' 72 Fol-
lowing its investigation, the Panel found numerous errors in the Bank's
practices, including flaws in the environmental assessment and the deter-
minations relating to the quality of the resettlement site. 1 73 The Bank con-
ceded to the findings of the majority of the Panel that it had violated Bank
policy and presented an action plan to remedy the project's faults, which
the Board approved. 174 On March 28, 2006 "[i]t was agreed that Manage-
ment would submit a progress report to the Board in no more than six
months."'175 Management submitted that progress report almost a year
later on March 1, 2007.176 In addition to the delay, "a number of issues [in
the action plan] still needed to be resolved and ... many of the target dates
listed in Management's Action Plan had not been met."'1 7 7
INSP/32034-CO Uuly 29, 2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXT
INSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ManagementReportandRecommendations.pdf.
167. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 49.
168. See The World Bank, Progress Report to the Board of Executive Directors on the
Implementation of the Management's Action Plan in Response to the Inspection Panel Inves-
tigation Report on the Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage, and Environmental Management
Project, at 2, Report No. 38182 (Sept. 4, 2006), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/lB/2006/12/13/000020953_2006121
3134653/Rendered/PDF/38182.pdf.
169. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 50-57; The Inspection Panel, The
World Bank, India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project (2004), http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20223785 -pagePK:641
29751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
170. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 50-51.
171. Id. at 51.
172. Id. at 51-52.
173. See generally The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Investigation Report on
India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project (IBRD Loan No. 4665-IN; IDA Credit No. 3662-IN),
at 197-220, Report No. 34725 (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/IPNMUTPFINAL.pdf.
174. ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 42, at 56-57.
175. Id. at 57.
176. ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007, supra note 131, at 77.
177. Id. (describing the many ways in which the Bank has failed to comply with the
terms of the remedial plan).
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C. Limited Panel Independence
An additional criticism of the existing system is that the Panel is not
entirely independent from the Bank as a whole. First, in relation to the
Panel's autonomy, critics have claimed that "as an interior body of the Bank
itself, its ideas cannot be completely independent of the ideology of that
institution." 178 Because the Panel is an arm of the Bank, it is by definition
an institution with a de facto World Bank bias and consequently acts with
the interests of the institution in mind and not necessarily with the inter-
ests of the affected communities.
In addition, some critics have argued that the Bank's ability to interfere
with the Panel's work (either at the investigation or the remedy stage), and
the lack of the Panel's ability to prevent such interference, also com-
promises its status as an independent body.179 Rather than an autonomy-
based argument, this criticism focuses on the Panel's lack of power.' 80
Because the Panel has no power to remedy the problems that it uncovers,
any resolution that the Panel ultimately helps a community achieve must
have also been within the desires of the Bank. Consequently, if the Bank
responds in a overly defensive or adversarial manner to the Panel's find-
ings, 18 1 or manipulates information to mislead the Board regarding com-
pliance, 182 it is very clear to the Board that the Bank is not in line with the
Panel's work and that any action that the Board orders will not be happily
178. Jason Morgan-Foster, Note, The Relationship of IMF Structural Adjustment Pro-
grams to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited, 24 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 577, 641 & nn.319-320 (2003) (framing the Panel's lack of independence as a
lack "independence of the ideas of the Panel from the ideology of the Bank," outlining
the Bank's denial that the two institutions are too close to be independent, and highlight-
ing some of the safeguards in place to ensure institutional independence).
179. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 207-08 (noting claims by Richard E. Bis-
sell that independence is only partial). Many concerns with the lack of Bank indepen-
dence were addressed in the two "Clarifications" to the Panel's resolution. See supra note
110 and accompanying text. For example, with the institution of the no-objection
approval for Panel investigations there was less fear that the Bank would fail to authorize
an investigation because it feared a finding of non-compliance. See supra note 110 and
accompanying text. Following the second clarification, the Bank also could no longer
institute action plans with the intention of preempting a Panel investigation. Under-
standing the Inspection Panel, supra note 138, at 16.
180. Morgan-Foster, supra note 178, at 641 n.319 (discussing Sigrun Skogly's belief
that the independence of the Panel should be measured with reference to its lack of
power to bind the Board of Directors of the Bank (citing SIGRUN SKOGLY, HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 184-85
(2001))).
181. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 254 (noting that in the past the Bank has had a
tendency "to respond defensively-denying that [it] violated any policies, challenging
the claimants' eligibility, and in some cases, challenging the panel's findings").
182. Understanding the Inspection Panel, supra note 138, at 18 (discussing the Lake
Victoria Environmental Management Project in Kenya as one egregious example of when
Management disputed the Panel's findings.) In the Lake Victoria case, the Panel con-
cluded that the Bank had violated its public-consultation requirements, but rather than
proposing remedies to address the Panel's findings, Management disputed them and
issued "a rebuttal document that gave the impression that consultations had taken
place." Id. In a follow up report, the Panel demonstrated that "management had
manipulated information in such a way as to deliberately mislead the board." Id.
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received. Vehement disapproval of the Panel's findings by the Bank is not
likely lost on the Board, which is ultimately charged with approving or
disapproving a resolution. 18 3 If the Panel was responsible for remedying
the problems that it uncovered, such an adversarial exchange would not be
problematic because the Panel could proceed with a remedial plan even
without the Bank's approval.
D. Obstacles to the Access of Panel's Procedures
Critics of the Panel also regularly raise concerns over the equity of the
access to Panel procedures and the resulting pro-Management bias. Specifi-
cally, once the affected parties (or their agents) have requested an inspec-
tion, the parties are not given the opportunity to address the Panel's
findings, Management's response, or review any of the information about
their claim prior to the Board decision on how to proceed. 184 Thus, while
the Board considers Management's recommendations, the original Reques-
ters are pushed aside, and the Board "ignore[es] the experience, knowl-
edge, and preferences of the people who triggered the process in the first
place."' 8 5
Coupled with the Management bias inherent in the Bank's relief pro-
cess, there are a number of structural obstacles to filing complaints, and
parties may find that the Panel has excluded their claim on procedural
grounds. For example, the Panel does not have the power to investigate
projects in cases where "the loan financing the project has been substan-
tially disbursed."'1 8 6 As critics point out, however, "many problems with
projects [that the Bank finances] don't show up until years after the funds
are disbursed;" thus, for these people, "there simply is no official
recourse."'1 8 7 For example, in the second request associated with India's
NTPC Power Generation Project, the Inspection Panel refused to register
the complaint because the "Request was filed after the loan financing the
project closed."' 88 Any and all harms emerging thereafter were simply not
redressable.
183. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, 23.
184. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267.
185. Id.
186. Inspection Panel Resolution, supra note 45, [ 14(c) & n.1 (defining "substantially
disbursed" as when "ninety five percent of the loan proceeds have been disbursed").
The 95% disbursement requirement was instituted "largely because the bank loses its
leverage to influence government implementation once it no longer controls the
finances." Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267. Of note, the Asian Development Bank's
Accountability Mechanism no longer includes a 95% disbursement limit as a cut off.
Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 216-17. The inspection mechanisms under the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Japan Bank for Interna-
tional Cooperation also do not have a disbursement limitation. Id. at 217.
187. Treakle et al., supra note 56, at 267 ("While the bank's policies apply to a project
until the loan is repaid, the panel is not an option for those people who learn about the
panel and choose to file a claim too late in the project cycle to meet the requirements for
eligibility.").
188. The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, India: NTPC Power Generation Project,
Second Request (1999) (1999), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXT
INSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/India-NTPC.pdf.
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Similarly, the Panel refused to register a 2007 Request for Inspection
associated with Cameroon's Urban Development Project and Douala Infra-
structure Development Project because the projects had closed in June
1988 and June 1994, respectively. 189 There, the Requesters complained
that the Bank had not provided "any information about the Projects [at the
time they were approved] and that they did not learn about World Bank
support for the Projects until 2003."190 The Requesters claimed that
"many of the affected people have suffered from depression and have felt
traumatized by the Projects,"'19 1 and they urged the Panel to hear the "con-
cerns of 'the 500 families in distress and in the streets for the past 20 years
because of the mismanagement"' of the project. 19 2 The Panel invoked the
95% disbursement policy when it refused to register the complaint, but
also "note[d], however, the many significant concerns stated by the Reques-
ters," which seemingly implied that the Bank should attempt to deal with
the problems. 193 Thus, any harms associated with the Bank's projects in
Cameroon will never be addressed within the Inspection Panel mechanism,
and the affected parties must rely on the goodwill of the Bank and the
government to provide redress, which is very unlikely. 19 4 This structural
impediment is a major barrier to solving many of the problems that can be
directly tied to Bank-funded projects.
IV. Possible Alternatives to the Inspection Panel
Despite several reoccurring problems with the Inspection Panel, 19 5
academics and practitioners have proposed few alternatives. Those who
have addressed the subject have explored the option of fixing the Panel's
shortcomings by working within its present framework. One approach has
focused on expanding the Panel's compliance-oriented mandate by
allowing the body to review compliance with policies other than those of
the Bank's. 19 6 Other proposals have focused on the need for better prob-
189. The Inspection Panel, The World Bank, Notice of Receipt of a Request for Inspec-
tion and Decision Not to Register, Cameroon- Urban Development Project (Loan No. 2244-
CM) and Second Urban Project (Loan No. 2999-CM) (2007), available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/SummaryofRequest.pdf.
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id. at 1-2.
192. Id. at 2 (quoting the Request for Inspection, which is available in French at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/ Resources/RequestWith
outMemos.pdf).
193. Id.
194. Id. ("'IT]he Bank consistently requested the competent authorities to address the
Nylon zone resettlement issue until the Second Urban project closed. Regrettably no
satisfactory solution was implemented by the Government .... While at this date, the
Bank cannot hold any fiduciary responsibility for the Nylon project .. .and cannot,
therefore offer any assistance . . . we will continue to raise the resettlement issue with the
authorities ...' (quoting Letter from Dir. of Operations for Cameroon, World Bank, to
Requesters (Oct. 23, 2006))).
195. See discussion supra Part II.
196. Currently, the Inspection Panel's mandate is limited to evaluating whether the
Bank has complied with its own policies and procedures. Operating Procedures, supra
note 1, at 512-13. See generally Roos, supra note 68, at 498-502 (arguing that the Panel
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lem-solving by ensuring that the Panel has the ability to monitor any reme-
dial action that is needed based on problems that the Panel uncovered
during its investigation. 1 9 7
As to the Inspection Panel itself (rather than accountability mecha-
nisms generally), there has been no proposal advocating for a replacement.
With regard to international financial institutions generally, however, at
least one scholar has detailed the need for mechanisms with a more effec-
tive combination of problem-solving and compliance review. 198 Scholars
have also indicated that arbitration may be the "most appropriate mode of
settlement" to ensure an adequate remedy for parties harmed by multilat-
eral development banks.19 9  These various proposals are outlined
below. 20
0
A. Panel Modifications: Better Remedial Structure for Problem-Solving
1. Development Effectiveness Remedy Team (DERT)
One set of proposed modifications to the present Panel focuses on
ensuring that the Bank follows through with remedial measures; which
would essentially transform the Panel from an entity solely concerned with
compliance review to one that also focuses on problem solving. Dana
Clark has proposed the development of a problem-solving unit within the
existing Inspection Panel framework to address the failure of the Panel to
ensure that the Bank takes proper remedial measures after an investiga-
tion.2 0 1 Clark calls the unit the Development Effectiveness Remedy Team
(DERT). 20 2 The unit would be charged with "remedying the social and
environmental policy violations identified by the Inspection Panel and
helping to ensure that displaced and aggrieved communities are adequately
compensated and assisted to improve their standards of living." 20 3
has not followed the approach taken in the Morse-Berger Report of 1992, which took
into account international law standards, but that instead the Panel reviews Bank per-
formance against its own internal rules). As Professor James Gathii has noted, the Panel
"has no mandate ... to even consider 'external' criteria such as Bank program compli-
ance with the ...International Bill of Human Rights or International Environmental
Treaties." James Gathii, Professor, Rutgers Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Remarks at Harvard
Law School Roundtable, The Cutting Edge: Roundtable of Current Research by Current
HLS Doctoral Students (Apr. 24, 1999).
197. See infra Part IV.A.
198. See infra Part IV.B.
199. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 224.
200. In a recent article, one practitioner recently proposed opening up the European
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to human rights claims against non-state actors
such as the Bank. Wahi, supra note 80, at 406-07.
201. See generally Clark, supra note 9, at 223-26. Dana Clark is president of the
International Accountability Project and the former director of the International Finan-
cial Institutions Program at the Center for International Environmental Law. Int'l
Accountability Project, Dana Clark, President and Founder, http://accountabilitypro
ject.org/articIe.phpid=130 (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
202. Clark, supra note 9, at 224.
203. Id.
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Unlike the Inspection Panel, DERT would be completely independent
from the Bank's Management and would report directly to the Board of
Executive Directors. 20 4 The unit would provide the Board with "oversight
and technical assistance to efforts to bring into compliance projects that
have been subject to Inspection Panel investigations. '20 5 It would also
work to ensure the execution of Management action plans and oversee the
implementation of the plans with the help of the affected community. 20 6
DERT's findings about the progress of a project under review would be
open to the public; community members in an affected area would have the
opportunity to participate in the unit's work, and those not involved
directly in the unit's decision-making process would have the ability to
"present and document their grievances and suggest remedial mea-
sures."20 7 Clark believes that this problem-solving unit would force the
Bank to "assume greater responsibility for ensuring compliance with its
policy framework, as well as for meeting the needs and respecting the
rights of local affected communities. '20 8
2. Arbitration to Encourage Problem-Solving
Similar to Ms. Clark, Eisuke Suzuki and Suresh Nanwani, also discuss
the need for accountability mechanisms "to monitor the progress of imple-
mentation of the recommendations" that multilateral development bank
(MDB) boards adopt following an inspection process. 20 9 In essence,
Suzuki and Nanwani see the benefit in expanding the role of accountability
mechanisms from only compliance-oriented to problem-solving entities as
well.
To highlight some of the Inspection Panel's deficiencies in this regard,
Suzuki and Nanwani conduct a comparison between the Panel and the
Accountability Mechanism (AM) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2 10
Generally, the AM has two phases: consultation and compliance review. 2 11
The consultation phase occurs prior to the compliance-review phase to
address "urgent claims of direct, material harm. '2 12 The consultation
phase seeks to reach "consensus and agreement on the complaint from all
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 226.
209. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 222-23. Suzuki and Nanwani are both
former employees of the Asian Development Bank. Id. at 177.
210. Id. at 189 (noting that the AM replaced the ADB's "Inspection Function" in
2003). See generally A HANDBOOK ON THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK: THE ADB AND ITS
OPERATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION (Dorothy Guerrero ed., 2003) (discussing
"important themes and issues that must be known and understood" about the ADB).
211. Asian Dev. Bank, Accountability Mechanism: Listening to Communities Affected
by ADB-Assisted Projects and Enhancing Developmental Effectiveness, http://www.adb.
org/Accountability-Mechanism/default.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
212. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 221-22; see also Asian Dev. Bank, Office of
the Special Project Facilitator, The Consultation Phase of the ADB's Accountability
Mechanism, http://www.adb.org/SPF/default.asp (last visited Dec. 11, 2008).
Vol. 41
2008 The World Bank's Inspection Panel
parties concerned, acceptable methods for resolution, and a timeframe for
resolving issues in the complaint. '2 13 Following consultation, a three-per-
son Compliance Review Panel (CRP) performs compliance review.2 14
Significantly different from the Inspection Panel, the CRP not only has
the ability to conduct a review of the project at issue, but also has the
authority to recommend remedial actions to the Board and monitor the
"implementation of remedial actions. '2 15 Furthermore, affected persons
have a greater participatory role under the Accountability Mechanism-as
claimants they have a right to be informed of the progress of both the con-
sultation and the compliance review and are additionally empowered to
comment on drafts of the CRP reports. 2 16 The ADB also helps to ensure
that affected communities are afforded a proper remedy for a violation of
the Bank's policies by eliminating the 95% disbursement requirement 2 17 to
which the Panel still adheres. 218
Although Suzuki and Nanwani believe the ADB's Accountability Mech-
anism is superior to that of the Inspection Panel, they have also highlighted
that, similar to other inspection mechanisms, "its competence does not
extend to the making of monetary indemnity or compensation for any
material harm."2 19 To address this lacuna, Suzuki and Nanwani believe
that arbitration is the "most appropriate mode of settlement for MDBs,"
and that it provides a "creative alternative to allow private parties' claims to
be settled."2 20
As part of their proposal, Suzuki and Nanwani point out that each
MDB has an administrative tribunal. 22 1 Consequently, they propose mov-
213. Asian Dev. Bank, Office of the Special Project Facilitator, What Is the Consulta-
tion Phase?, http://www.adb.org/SPF/what-Consultation.asp (last visited Nov. 11,
2008).
214. See generally Asian Dev. Bank, Compliance Review Panel, http://compliance.adb.
org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); see also Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 221-23
(discussing the two phases).
215. ASIAN DEv. BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM, OPERA-
TIONAL PROCEDURES FOR COMPLIANCE REVIEW PANEL 8-10 (2004).
216. Id. at 8.
217. See discussion supra note 186 and accompanying text.
218. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 217 ("The new ADB Accountability Mecha-
nism replaces the 95 percent disbursement limit as a cut-off with the date of the issuance
of a project completion report (PCR) for the ADB-assisted project. The ADB issues the
PCR within 1-2 years after the project is physically completed and in operation.").
219. Id. at 224. This is not to imply that the AM is without other potential faults,
however. Hemantha Withanage, the Executive Director of the group NGO Forum on
ADB, has recently criticized the ADB for failing to respond appropriately to the recom-
mendations of the CRP, as revealed in the annual CRP Monitoring Report. See Accounta-
bility Mechanism: A Jailbird of Bureaucracy, http://hwithanage-accountability
mechanism.blogspot.com/ (an. 30, 2008, 02:10 EST). He has also claimed that the low
number of requests filed indicate that the AM complaint system is too "cumbersome" for
lay people. Id.
220. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 224 ("A corollary of the principle of
responsibility is the principle of remedy .... ").
221. See, e.g., Asian Dev. Bank, Administrative Tribunal, http://wvw.adb.org/ADBT/
default.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) ("ADB Board of Directors established the Admin-
istrative Tribunal in 1991 as an external mechanism to review personnel decisions by
Management.").
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ing parties' claims from the "compliance review phase to [a MDB] adminis-
trative tribunal, which could be metamorphosed as a special tribunal
established at the request and consent of the parties."2 22 They provide no
further details, however, on how such a move would work 2 23 and caution
that the use of arbitration must not "jeopardiz[e] the organizational effec-
tiveness of MDBs" given the "reconfiguration of authority and control over
decisions of international organizations [that] inevitably occurs" in such
situations.2 24
3. Tort Remedies and Arbitration
Highlighting the possibility of another resolution to the problems with
the Inspection Panel, Koen de Feyter advocates for the use of tort remedies
and international arbitration as a means of ensuring Bank accountability
to affected parties. 2 25 Because only the Bank and the Borrower are parties
to a particular project's loan agreement, de Feyter points out that affected
parties do not have the right to sue for failure to implement the agreement
because there is no privity between the parties. 22 6 He argues, however,
that tort law may provide an alternative avenue for affected parties to cabin
their claims because the affected parties can
argue that they suffered injury as a consequence of a wrongful act or omis-
sion committed by the Borrower and the Bank. With respect to the Bank, the
affected persons may argue negligence. The submission then is that the
Bank breached its duty to take care by not contemplating the injurious effect
on the affected persons, when deciding not to insist on the implementation
of the agreement, or on compliance with operation polices .... 227
To prevent the Bank from blaming the Borrower, de Feyter discusses the
potential of joint responsibility, "using a concept of complicity between
multiple tortfeasors. ' 228
In conjunction with these tort remedies, de Feyter briefly points out
that international arbitration "may offer the best opportunities" for the
adjudication of disputes between the World Bank and private parties, and
that the Optional Rules for Arbitration between International Organiza-
tions and Private Parties developed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
"offer a suitable framework for settling [such] disputes. ' 229 De Feyter,
however, does not elaborate further.
222. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 224.
223. Id. at 222-25.
224. Id. at 224-25.
225. See Koen de Feyter, Self-Regulation, in WORLD BANK, IMF AND HUMAN RIGHTS 79,
129 (Willem van Genugten, Paul Hunt & Susan Mathews eds., 2003).
226. Id. at 129.
227. Id. at 129-30.
228. Id. at 130 ("Direct complicity requires intentional participation, but not necessa-
rily any intention to do harm, only knowledge of the likely harmful effects of the assis-
tance given.").
229. Id. at 135.
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B. Reforming Inspection Mechanisms Generally
Unlike the singular approach of expanding either compliance or prob-
lem-solving responsibilities, Professor Daniel Bradlow has developed a pro-
posal for an accountability mechanism that would emphasize both. In
developing his proposal, Professor Bradlow conducted a comprehensive
survey of existing accountability mechanisms and discussed the three most
feasible structures within the context of international financial
institutions. 230
Bradlow notes that inspection mechanisms can be designed to per-
form three different, but not mutually exclusive, functions: compliance
review, problem-solving, and lessons learned-the third function providing
the institution with the ability to improve its performance. 23 1 Accordingly,
he proposes a Compliance Review and Problem-Solving Mechanism
(CRPSM), an entity that incorporates separate divisions focusing on policy-
and-procedure compliance and problem-solving, and that includes the "les-
sons-learned" function. 23 2 For much of his proposal, Bradlow draws from
the African Development Bank's (AFDB) accountability entity, which also
has independent compliance and problem-solving divisions.2 33
Under Bradlow's proposal, the CRPSM would consist of a Director as
well as a Roster of Experts. 234 The organization would appoint the Direc-
tor who would work solely on compliance and problem-solving matters. 235
This would have the effect of ensuring that the mechanism received "all the
attention it need[ed]" and that the institution and those outside of the
organization recognized its "credibility and prestige."2 36 To ensure inde-
pendence from the larger institution, the Director would be limited in his
or her ability to work for the institution both prior and subsequent to his or
230. See Bradlow, supra note 138, at 467-83 (presenting the options as (1) an inspec-
tion mechanism, which could include either a committee, full-time panel, or ad hoc
panel; (2) an ombudsperson; or (3) a combined compliance review and problem-solving
mechanism).
231. Id. at 464-65. Bradlow has cautioned that the institution must consider the
weight the organization would like to accord to compliance review verses problem-solv-
ing and, if incorporating a level of compliance review, whether the institutions' "opera-
tional policies and procedures are sufficiently well developed" to serve as the basis for
such review. Id. at 468.
232. See id. at 479-83, 486-91 (providing the Terms of Reference for the proposed
CRPSM).
233. Id. at 479, 482-83 (discussing the benefits of the CRPSM compared to AFDB's
mechanism); see also African Dev. Bank Group, Independent Review Mechanism (IRM),
http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?-pageid=473,5848220&-dad=portal&-schema=POR
TAL (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) (providing an outline of the mechanism's Compliance
Review and Mediation Unit (CRMU) and the Roster of Experts). See generally AFRICAN
DEv. BANK GROUP, COMPLIANCE REviEw AND MEDIATION UNIT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
MECHANISM: OPERATING RULES AND PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.afdb.org/
pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/CRMUDOCS/OPERATING%
20RULES%20AND%20PROCEDURES%20EN.pdf.
234. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 479.
235. Id. at 479.
236. Id. at 482 (noting that this feature is not included in any review mechanism
currently used by international development institutions).
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her appointment and could only be dismissed for cause.2 3 7
As an initial matter, the Director would be responsible for receiving
complaints from persons affected by one of the institution's projects. 238
The claimants would have the option of specifying whether they were seek-
ing problem-solving help or compliance review. 23 9 The Director would
also have the power to determine the type of review most appropriate for
the complainants and, in turn, inform the institution of his or her decision
and the reason for that decision. 240
Assuming that problem-solving was appropriate, the Director would
lead the affected parties in a "problem-solving exercise," ultimately issuing
a report to the institution regardless of whether the problem-solving was
success or failure. 24 1 In cases of successful problem-solving, the Director
would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the solution. 24 2
If the exercise failed, however, the Director would be empowered to suggest
remedial action.24 3 The financial institution would ultimately be responsi-
ble for determining whether to accept or reject the Director's proposal.2 44
If the institution decided not to proceed with the suggested remedies, it
would have to provide its reasons to the parties involved, including the
claimants. 245
If claimants request compliance review rather than problem-solving, or
if the Director determines that compliance review would be more appropri-
ate either as an initial matter or following a problem-solving exercise, the
Roster of Experts then would become involved. 24 6 The Roster of Experts
would consist of three members appointed by the organization's board. 24 7
As with the Director, there would be limits on the experts' ability to work
with the institution both prior to and following their term on the roster.248
The experts could only be removed from the roster for cause 249 and would
not be able to work for the organization in a capacity outside of the CRPSM
during their tenure on the roster. 250 The experts would also be expected to
spend time familiarizing themselves with the operations of the institu-
tion 2 5 '-which is similar to the requirement imposed by the European
237. Id. at 479.
238. Id. at 480.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 480-81.
241. Id. at 481; see also African Dev. Bank Group, Mediation (Problem-Solving) Exer-
cise, http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?-pageid=473,5848232&-dadportal&-schema=
PORTAL (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
242. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 481.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 482.
247. Id. at 479.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 479-80.
251. Id. at 480.
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Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 25 2
Once the need for compliance-review emerges, the board of the institu-
tion would be charged with appointing a compliance-review panel.2 53 The
panel would include two experts from the Roster, as well as the Direc-
tor. 25 4 However, the Director's role on the panel would be limited-he or
she would engage in discussions regarding the compliance investigation,
but would only vote on whether the institution was in compliance with its
polices or procedures if the panel was deadlocked. 25 5 Following an investi-
gation, the compliance-review panel would be required to present a report
to the board detailing its "findings of fact and recommendations for correc-
tive action," and the board would vote to accept, reject, or modify the
findings.2 56
In addition to the problem-solving exercise and the compliance-review
panel, Bradlow's proposal requires that the Director issue an annual report
that would include information about the activities of the CRPSM-particu-
larly some of the "trends that have emerged in the year's problem-solving
exercises" and lessons learned from the various issues with which the
entity dealt.2 57 The report would be made publicly available. 258 Bradlow,
however, recognizes the shortcomings of his proposal. 25 9 For example, he
mentions the possibility that claimants may be unmotivated to participate
in the problem-solving exercise because they may feel that compliance
review would be more fruitful. 260
Generally, Bradlow envisions the CRPSM as part of the third-genera-
tion of accountability mechanisms-those that provide both problem-solv-
ing and compliance-review capabilities independently. 2 61 Three other
such examples include the Asian Development Bank's Accountability
Mechanism, 26 2 the African Development Bank's Independent Review
Mechanism, 26 3 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment's Independent Recourse Mechanism. 26 4
252. Id. at 480 n.264. But see id. at 482-83 (discussing the differences between the
EBRD and this proposed mechanism). See generally European Bank for Reconstruction
& Dev., About the Independent Recourse Mechanism, http://www.ebrd.com/about/
integrity/irm/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
253. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 482.
254. Id. (indicating that the Board also has the power to appoint the panel's chair
from the compliance-review panel members).
255. Id. at 482.
256. Id. at 491.
257. Id. at 482.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 483.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 484.
262. See supra notes 209-220 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 233 (discussing some aspects of the AFDB's mechanism).
264. See supra note 252. See generally EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV.,
INDEPENDENT RECOURSE MECHANISM (2003), available at http://www.ebrd.com/about/
integrity/irm/about/irm.pdf (providing background on the establishment of the EBRD's
review mechanism); EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEv., INDEPENDENT
RECOURSE MECHANISM: RULES OF PROCEDURE (2004), available at http://www.ebrd.com/
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V. Arbitration as an Alternative
Not surprisingly, the Bank's current Inspection Panel-while cutting
edge when it was instituted in 1993265 -has become antiquated when com-
pared to those mechanisms that have emerged more recently. It is because
the present Inspection Panel fails to meet the needs and the expectations of
claimant communities 26 6 that we propose a new arbitration-based account-
ability mechanism that builds upon the third-generation mechanisms and
incorporates some of the reforms proposed by various observers discussed
above.
A. Fundamental Principles
Our proposal is based upon several fundamental propositions. First,
in today's era it is axiomatic that international organizations that wield
considerable power in the domestic affairs of their member states be held
accountable for the way in which their power is exercised. 267 In addition
to political, administrative, and financial mechanisms, legal accountability
is crucial. Accordingly, an effective remedial mechanism is "essential to
any accountability regime for international organisations."
268
Second, international organizations such as the World Bank are no
longer immune to the dictates of human rights law. International organiza-
tions are bound by customary international law. 269 Therefore, the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, which is declaratory of customary
international law,270 is binding upon the Bank. Pursuant to the Universal
Declaration:
about/integrity/irm/about/procedur.pdf (outlining the compliance and problem-solving
foci of the IRM).
265. Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 21, at 187-88 ("The establishment of the World
Bank's Inspection Panel in late 1993 was an extraordinary development .... Never
before had any entity independent of the governing organs of an international organiza-
tion existed to hear and investigate complaints filed by private individuals ...." (inter-
nal citations omitted)).
266. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 484-85 (referring to the Bank's Inspection Panel as
part of the first generation of review mechanisms which focused exclusively on compli-
ance even when the Requesters saw the entity as a venue for problem solving as well).
267. Bradlow, supra note 138, at 405; see Int'l Comm. on the Accountability of Int'l
Orgs., Final Report to the Seventy-First ILA Conference Held in Berlin (2004), in INT'L L.
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST CONFERENCE HELD IN BERLIN 164, 167-68 (Prof. A H
A Soons & Christopher Ward eds., 2004).
268. KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 184 (2002);
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 9 (2d ed. 2005) ("Access
to justice implies that the procedures are effective, i.e. capable of redressing the harm
that was inflicted.").
269. See C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGAN1ZATIONS 399-406 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that under customary international law,
international organizations can have obligations towards other international persons
arising from particular circumstances or relationships and giving examples of the
same); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW:
UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 822-25 (3d ed. 1995).
270. See W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contempo-
rary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867 (1990).
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Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
27 1
Moreover, "[eiveryone is entitled to a social and international order in
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized. '27 2 Complementing the rights set forth in the Universal Declara-
tion is the "right to development," which the United Nations General
Assembly declared to be "an inalienable human right. '2 73 Accordingly,
"[s]tates have the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formu-
late international development policies with a view to facilitating the full
realization of the right to development. ' 2 74 Viewed in a progressive light,
the realization of economic and social human rights should be incumbent
not only upon states but upon non-state actors, including international
organizations such as the Bank. 2 7 5 Indeed, Clark has noted that
the Bank considers itself to be in the forefront of efforts to promote eco-
nomic and social human rights, asserting that '[t]hrough its support of pri-
mary education, health care and nutrition, sanitation, housing, and the
environment, the Bank has helped hundreds of millions of people attain cru-
cial economic and social rights.
2 7 6
The third fundamental proposition relates to compensation. Although
member states are "owners" of the Bank's projects and are therefore respon-
sible for any harm the projects may cause their local communities, to the
271. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 25(1), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
272. Id. art. 28.
273. Declaration on the Right of Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, art. 1(1),
U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4,
1986).
274. Id. art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
275. See Christine Chinkin, The United Nations Decade for the Elimination of Poverty:
What Role for International Law?, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBs. 553, 559 (2001). See gener-
ally SKOGLY, supra note 180 (applying public international law and international human
rights law to a discussion on the possible existence of international human rights obliga-
tions to the World Bank and the IMF).
276. Clark, supra note 9, at 211 (quoting WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 3 (1998)). Clark further states: "As noted by the
former General Counsel of the World Bank, 'balanced development can only be achieved
if the basic human rights are secured for persons adversely affected by development."'
Id. at 226 (quoting Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Aspects of Involuntary Population Displace-
ment, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT: POLICY, PRACTICE,
AND THEORY 27 (Michael M. Cernea & Scott E. Guggenheim eds., 1993)); see also
SKOGLY, supra note 180 (arguing that the World Bank and the IMF are bound by interna-
tional human rights law). See generally Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization of Human
Rights Law and the Role of the International Financial Institutions in Promoting Human
Rights, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 71, 96 (2000) (concluding that the IMF and the
multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, "are well-positioned, by vir-
tue of their vast resources and influence, to do even more in the years ahead to further
promote human rights in their member countries"); Wahi, supra note 80 (proposing the
adoption of a horizontal application of human rights law to the World Bank and the
IMF).
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extent that the Bank itself causes the harm because of its failure to follow
its own policies and procedures, the Bank should be responsible for fully
compensating the harmed communities. As stated by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzow Case,
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is
not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitu-
tion in kind would bear; the award, if need be, [could be for] damages for
loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment
in place of it.
2 7 7
That harmed communities could recover damages is not inconsistent
with the doctrine of functional necessity, which provides that "interna-
tional organizations are entitled to such immunities as will enable them to
exercise their functions in the fulfillment of their purposes. '27 8 There is
no question that after the advent of the Marshall Plan, the primary purpose
of the World Bank has been to promote development. Accordingly, holding
the Bank accountable for damages resulting from its failure to follow its
own policies and procedures in development projects would promote,
rather than detract from, the Bank's purposes. 2
79
Fourth, when devising a remedial mechanism with respect to claims
by individuals or groups of individuals against an international organiza-
tion, it is important to keep in mind that there is a marked inequality in
positions between the former and the latter. As Karel Wellens has argued,
international organizations therefore have "the duty to establish appropri-
ate remedial mechanisms to do justice as between [them] and third parties
other than officials." 28 0 In doing so, the parties should be treated as
equals. 281 Arbitration would accomplish this goal. Unlike the current
277. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.CJ. 136, 198 Uuly 9). "The responsible State is
under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act." INT'L LAW COMM'N, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTER-
NATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIES art. 31(1) (2001), available at http://
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6 2001.pdf. "Injury
includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful
act of a State." Id. art. 31(2); see SHELTON, supra note 268, at 52 ("Notably, the ICJ has
indicated that the basic principle of reparation articulated in the Chorz6w Factory case
applies to reparation for injury to individuals .... ").
278. Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human
Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53, 56 (1995); see also AUGUST
REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 233-38 (2000).
279. See Singer, supra, note 278, at 58 (arguing that "human rights norms impose[ ] a
limitation on the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations"); see also de
Feyter, supra note 225, at 133-34 ("[I]f claimants would be successful in obtaining
appropriate compensation, the court would be assisting the Bank in fulfilling its mission
as defined by its Articles of Agreement .... ").
280. WELLENS, supra note 268, at 25-26.
281. Id. at 24; see PHILLIP CAPPER, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK 41 (3d ed.
2004) (commenting upon the French case Siemens AG v. Dutco where the Cour de Cassa-
tion "ruled that the method of appointment of the tribunal breached the principle that
the parties should be treated equally in the arbitration").
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Inspection Panel procedure, arbitration would ensure "that the parties are
treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is
given a full opportunity of presenting its case."'28 2 Moreover, severing the
arbitral body completely from the World Bank ensures that claimant com-
munities will receive an independent, impartial hearing. 28 3
B. Arbitration Under the Bank's General Conditions for Loans
Arbitration, of course, is not foreign to the World Bank. In addition to
arbitration of disputes internal to the Bank, 28 4 the Bank's General Condi-
tions for Loans28 5 stipulate that disputes between the Bank and the bor-
rowing member country are to be settled by arbitration. 28 6 The existing
Arbitral Tribunal consists of three arbitrators. 28 7 The Bank appoints one
arbitrator; the second arbitrator is appointed by the Loan Parties (or, if they
do not agree, by the Guarantor). 28 8 The third arbitrator, the Umpire, is
282. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration Between Interna-
tional Organizations and Private Parties, art. 15(1) [hereinafter Optional Rules].
283. "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an indepen-
dent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations .... "
UDHR, supra note 271, art. 10 (emphasis added). "All persons shall be equal before the
courts and tribunals. In the determination of ... his rights and obligations in a suit at
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent
and impartial tribunal established by law." International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 14(1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (emphasis added).
284. Under the World Bank Group's Conflict Resolution System (CRS), staff members
can resort to arbitration, via the Appeals Committee, to challenge administrative deci-
sions with respect to employment issues or disciplinary action based on misconduct.
See The World Bank, Conflict Resolution System - CRS, http://go.worldbank.org/
GA9N4HD110 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). A panel of three Appeals Committee Panel
members is designated to review each appeal. Id. The Panel prepares a Report of its
findings and recommendations, which is submitted to the Vice President of Human
Resources (HRSVP). The World Bank, The Appeals Process, http://go.worldbank.org/
GGCGVClGRO (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). The HRSVP, or designated Senior Official
(in the event the HRSVP is disqualified), reviews the recommendation of the Appeals
Committee and makes a decision on the Appeal. Id. The Administrative Tribunal, com-
posed of seven judges, is the final stage of the process available to staff who are not
satisfied with the resolution of their issues through the appeal process. See id.
285. The General Conditions "set forth certain terms and conditions generally appli-
cable to the Loan Agreement and to any other Legal Agreement." General Conditions,
supra note 151, § 1.01. They apply to the extent the Legal Agreement so provides." Id.
The General Conditions further state: "If any provision of any Legal Agreement is incon-
sistent with a provision[,] . . . the provision of the Legal Agreement shall govern." Id.
§ 1.02.
286. Id. § 8.04(a). The controversy may be between parties to the Loan Agreement or
the parties to the Guarantee Agreement. Id. Arbitration is the exclusive forum of dispute
resolution:
The provisions for arbitration set forth in this Section shall be in lieu of any
other procedure for the settlement of controversies between the parties to the
Loan Agreement and Guarantee Agreement or of any claim by any such party
against any other such party arising under such Legal Agreements.
Id. § 8.040).
287. Id. § 8.04(c).
288. Id.
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appointed by agreement of the parties. 28 9 If they do not agree, 2 90 however,
the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary-General
of the United Nations appoints the Umpire. 2 91 If a side fails to appoint an
arbitrator, the Umpire will appoint the arbitrator.
29 2
An arbitration proceeding is instituted upon notice by the party insti-
tuting such proceeding to the other party.2 93 The notice must contain a
statement setting forth (i) the nature of the controversy or claim, (ii) the
nature of the relief sought, and (iii) the name of the arbitrator appointed by
the instituting party. 294 Within thirty days of such notice, the other party
must notify the instituting party of the name of the arbitrator it has
appointed.295
The Arbitral Tribunal convenes at such time and place as determined
by the Umpire. 296 Thereafter, the Tribunal determines where and when it
shall sit.2 9 7 The Tribunal decides "all questions relating to its compe-
tence."2 98 It also determines its procedure, "except as the parties shall oth-
erwise agree."'29 9 All decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal are made by
majority vote. 30 0 Although the provisions do not expressly state what law
the Tribunal is to apply, former Vice President and General Counsel of the
World Bank Aron Broches has argued that-in light of § 10.01 of the Gen-
eral Conditions (now § 8.01) 3 0 1 -the Bank's agreement with a member
state is governed by public international law; therefore the Tribunal is
bound to apply that law.
30 2
The Arbitral Tribunal must give all parties a fair hearing and must
render its award in writing, signed by a majority of the Tribunal. 30 3 The
289. Id.
290. The parties have sixty days after the notice instituting the arbitration proceeding
to agree upon an Umpire. Id. § 8.04(e).
291. Id. § 8.04(c). If the parties failed to agree during this period, either party would
have the power to request the appointment of the Umpire. Id. § 8.04(e).
292. Id. § 8.04(c). If an appointed arbitrator resigns, dies, or becomes unable to act, a
successor arbitrator is appointed in the same manner as prescribed for the appointment
of the original arbitrator and will have all the powers and duties of the original arbitra-
tor. Id.
293. Id. § 8.04(d).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. § 8.04(0.
297. Id.
298. Id. § 8.04(g).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Section 8.01 of the General Conditions states: "The rights and obligations of the
Bank and the Loan Parties under the Legal Agreements shall be valid and enforceable in
accordance with their terms notwithstanding the law of any state or political subdivision
thereof to the contrary." Id. § 8.01.
302. Letter from Aron Broches to Editors-in-Chief, Am. Journal of Int'l Law, in 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 489, 490 (1997). However, Broches argues that an agreement between the
Bank and a non-state "is certainly not an international agreement governed by interna-
tional law." Aron Broches, International Legal Aspects of the Operations of the World
Bank, 98 RECUEIL Des CouRs 297, 351 (1959).
303. General Conditions, supra note 151, § 8.04(h).
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award may be rendered by default. 30 4 It is "final and binding upon the
parties to the Loan Agreement and the Guarantee Agreement. '30 5 If the
parties have not complied with the award within thirty days after counter-
parts of the award have been delivered to the parties, a party may
(i) enter judgment upon, or institute a proceeding to enforce, the award in
any court of competent jurisdiction against any other party; (ii) enforce such
judgment by execution; or (iii) pursue any other appropriate remedy against
such other party for the enforcement of the award and the provisions of the
Loan Agreement or Guarantee Agreement.
30 6
The parties are responsible for fixing the amount of remuneration of
the arbitrators and others required for the conduct of the arbitration pro-
ceedings. 30 7 If the parties do not agree upon remuneration before the Arbi-
tral Tribunal convenes, the Tribunal will fix an amount that is reasonable
under the circumstances. 30 8 The parties will defray their own expenses in
the arbitration proceedings. 30 9 The costs of the Arbitral Tribunal "shall be
divided between and borne equally by the Bank on the one side and the
Loan Parties on the other." 3 10
Although the Bank has provided for an arbitration framework to
resolve disputes between itself and its member states, the provisions have
never been invoked. 3 11 As Ibrahim Shihata, former Vice President and
General Counsel of the World Bank, has written, because there are on-
going relations between the Bank and its member states, there is an incen-
tive to resolve disputes through negotiation. 3 12 Moreover, negotiated reso-
lutions are facilitated because "the Bank's agreements with its borrowers
provides the law governing their relationship which prevails over any con-
flicting text in the borrower's domestic law or the Bank's Articles. 3 13
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. § 8.04(k). The paragraph states further: "Notwithstanding the foregoing, this
section shall not authorize any entry of judgment or enforcement of the award against
the Member Country except as such procedure may be available otherwise than by rea-
son of the provisions of this Section." Id.
307. Id. § 8.04(i).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. "Any question concerning the division of the costs of the Arbitral Tribunal or
the procedure for payment of such costs shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal."
Id.
311. Ibrahim F. 1. Shihata, Avoidance and Settlement of Disputes-The World Bank's
Approach and Experience, 1 INT'L L. F. Du DROIT INT'L 90, 93 (1999).
312. Id. at 92.
313. Id. at 93. Shihata notes:
All disputes, including the most difficult ones, such as the partition of the out-
standing debt of former Yugoslavia among its successor states, and the insis-
tence of Romania, before its transition, on the prepayment of its outstanding
Bank loans without paying the required penalty, were resolved through negotia-
tion over a short period of time.
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C. Administrative Remedy at the World Bank: Office of Claims
Resolution
In keeping with well-known principles relating to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies and as reflected in the current Inspection Panel
procedures, 3 14 under our proposal, claimant communities could not resort
to the type of arbitration set forth in the General Conditions for Loans
without first attempting to resolve the dispute directly with the Bank. The
Bank would establish an Office of Claims Resolution (OCR), comprised of
a Board-appointed Director and support staff. Through the use of a Roster
of Claims Resolution Intermediators, the OCR would combine a problem-
solving approach with compliance review. In other words, we see no need
to have a bifurcated mechanism similar to the ADB's Accountability Mecha-
nism or Professor Bradlow's proposed CRPSM. 3 15
The administrative procedure would begin with the filing of a Request
for Claim Resolution either within twelve months after the completion of
the project or after the final disbursement of the loan.3 16 However, filing
outside of this period would be allowed in exceptional circumstances
where the claimants could show manifestly compelling reasons for failing
to file on a timely basis. The Request would set forth (i) the claimant com-
munity's identity as a group of two or more persons who share a common
interest or concern; (ii) an explanation of how the Bank is not in compli-
ance with its owns policies and procedures; (iii) the material harm that the
claimant community has suffered or is likely to suffer as a result of the
alleged non-compliance; and (iv) a proposed remedy.
The Bank's Board would appoint a Director of the OCR, who would
receive Requests, ensure the Requests set forth the required information,
coordinate the appointment of an Intermediator, and produce the OCR's
annual report. The Director, who would work independently of the Bank's
Management, could serve for an indefinite term. The OCR would maintain
a diverse twelve-person Roster of Intermediators. The Board would appoint
the Intermediators after consultation with the NGO community. To ensure
their independence, the Intermediators would be barred from working for
the Bank for two years prior to their appointment. The Intermediators
would be chosen on the basis of their knowledge of the Bank's operations
and their expertise in development issues. Moreover, the Roster would be
globally diverse-i.e., it would not be dominated by persons from one par-
ticular culture.
314. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (Requester of Panel must show
steps it has taken to resolve the issue with the Bank).
315. See discussion supra Part IV and accompanying text (outlining these two
mechanisms).
316. Our proposal is based on the filing period set forth under the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development's Independent Recourse Mechanism. See EUR. BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., INDEPENDENT RECOURSE MECHANISM: THE GUIDE TO MAKING
A COMPLAINT ABOUT AN EBRD-FINANCED PROJECT (2004), available at http://www.ebrd.
com/about/policies/irm/irm.pdf.
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In addition to an initial training session on the policies and proce-
dures of the Bank-including past case studies of issues where the Inspec-
tion Panel encountered the largest number of problems-the
Intermediators would periodically be required to spend some time at the
Bank so they may be apprised of any developments relating to the Bank's
operations, operating policy, and procedures. After serving a three-year
term, resigning from the Roster, or being removed therefrom for cause by
the Bank's Board, the Intermediators would not be eligible to work for the
Bank for two years.
Upon the submission of the Request for Claim Resolution, the Director
would have five business days to determine whether the claim on its face is
clearly ineligible.317 If it is not, the Director would have thirty business
days to assist the claimant community and the Bank in selecting an Inter-
mediator from the Roster. If the claimant community and the Bank could
not agree on an Intermediator, the Director would make the choice. The
Bank or the claimant community could challenge the Director's choice on
the grounds that the chosen Intermediator was inappropriate, in which
case the Director would make another, final appointment. In urgent cases,
the Director could shorten the appointment period to ten days.
Once appointed, the Intermediator would have up to thirty business
days to ensure that the claimant community had standing and that the
jurisdictional requirement was met. If the Intermediator rejected the
Request on either ground, the claimant community would have the right to
have another Intermediator-mutually agreed upon or appointed by the
Director-review the Request (within a thirty-day period) with respect to
these threshold issues. If the second Intermediator rejected the Request,
the claimant community's Request would be dismissed with prejudice-i.e.,
they would be unable to resort to arbitration. The claimant community,
however, could resubmit a Request if they could show there was new evi-
dence or new circumstances surrounding the problem or issue in question.
If the Intermediator concluded that both the standing and jurisdic-
tional requirements were met, he or she would first conduct an investiga-
tion to determine whether the Bank was in compliance with its own
policies and procedures. If the Intermediator determined that the Bank
was in compliance with its own policies and procedures, he or she would
inform the claimant community and provide a detailed description of the
reasons for his or her decision to both the community and the Bank. This
description would remain on file in the OCR and be readily accessible by
the public. If the claimant community disagreed with the Intermediator's
conclusion and still believed that the Bank was not in compliance with its
policies and procedures, the claimant community would then have to
decide whether to pursue arbitration.
317. Under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Independent
Recourse Mechanism, the Chief Compliance Officer must determine whether the com-
plaint is "manifestly ineligible" within five business days of the receipt of the complaint.
See id. at 41.
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If, however, the Intermediator determined that the Bank was not in
compliance with its own policies and procedures, he or she would have the
authority to take all appropriate actions to help the parties resolve the mat-
ter. The exercise would require the Bank's Management, in consultation
with the Bank's Board, to (i) respond directly to the allegations set forth in
the claimant community's initial complaint, which the Intermediator con-
firmed; (ii) directly address the remedy that the claimant community pro-
posed in the initial complaint and, if the Management does not adopt it,
present reasons for the failure to adopt the claimant-community's proposed
remedy; (iii) propose a plan of action, which might include financial com-
pensation, to bring the Bank back into compliance with its policies and
procedures; and (iv) in the event the project was completed, consider the
amount of compensation that would put the claimant community in the
position it would have been in before commencement of the project. 318
The claimant community would have an opportunity to comment
upon the adequacy of the plan of action or proposed compensation. If the
parties agreed on a plan of action or compensation through the efforts of
the Intermediator, the Intermediator would produce a public report for the
Director setting forth the plan of action, including firm timetables, or the
agreed compensation. Because the Board would have already consulted
with the Bank's Management regarding the plan of action or compensation,
no further Board approval would be required. If the Bank failed to abide by
the plan of action, including the specific timetables therein, the claimant
community could institute arbitration proceedings to compel the Bank to
abide by its plan of action and otherwise to collect damages resulting from
the Bank's failure to do so.
If the parties could not come to a mutually agreeable resolution either
by way of a plan of action or compensation, the Claim Resolution exercise
would come to an end. The Intermediator would prepare a public report
for the Director setting forth the reasons for the unsuccessful resolution of
the claim. At that point, the claimant community could pursue arbitration.
D. Arbitration
Although we could graft the arbitration provisions of the Bank's Gen-
eral Conditions for Loans described above onto our proposal, we prefer
instead to rely upon the Optional Rules for Arbitration between Interna-
tional Organizations and Private Parties (Optional Rules for Private Par-
318. As noted, under the current Inspection Panel procedure, the claimant commu-
nity must claim that "an action or omission of the Bank to follow its own operational
policies and procedures during the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a Bank-
financed project" will have an "actual or threatened material adverse effect on [their]
rights or interests." See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. In the 1999 clarifica-
tions, the Board stated:
For assessing material adverse effect, the without-project situation should be
used as the base case for comparison, taking into account what baseline infor-
mation may be available. Non-accomplishments and unfulfilled expectations
that do not generate a material deterioration compared to the without-project
situation will not be considered as a material adverse effect for this purpose.
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ties) produced by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), as modified
below.3 19 The Rules, which closely follow the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules of arbitration, 3 20 are a
product of a Steering Committee appointed by the PCA's Secretary-Gen-
eral, which noted the need to include international organizations as parties
in the PCA's dispute-settlement proceedings. 3 2 1 In addition to producing
optional rules for arbitration between international organizations and
states, the Steering Committee also drew up rules that would govern dis-
putes between private parties and international organizations. 3 22
The Optional Rules for Private Parties, which entered into effect on
July 1, 1996,323 set forth a comprehensive set of arbitration rules ranging
from provisions on notice of arbitration, 324 to the composition of the arbi-
tral tribunal,32 5 to the arbitral proceedings themselves, 3 26 and to the
award.3 27 A number of provisions are worth noting. First, the rules are
"subject to such modification as the parties may agree in writing."3 28 Sec-
ond, agreement to the rules "constitutes a waiver of any right of immunity
from jurisdiction, in respect of the dispute in question, to which such party
might otherwise be entitled. '3 29 Moreover, "waiver of immunity relating to
the execution of an arbitral award must be explicitly addressed. '330 Thus,
under our proposal, as already stipulated in the General Conditions for
1999 CLARIFICATIONS, supra note 50, 1 14.
319. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes established
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899. Tjaco
T. Van Den Hout, The Permanent Court of Arbitration: Responding to a Century of Global-
ization, 2 INT'L L. F. Du DROIT INT'L 235, 235 (2000). The 1899 Convention was revised
at the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Scott Armstrong Spence, Organizing an
Arbitration Involving an International Organization and Multiple Private Parties, 21 J. INT'L
ARBITRATION 309, 314 n.43 (2004). In the mid-1930s, the PCA agreed to administer a
"mixed" arbitration in which one of the parties was a foreign corporation rather than a
State. Van Den Hout, supra, at 235. In 1962, the PCA created the "Rules of Arbitration
and Conciliation for settlement of international disputes between two parties of which
only one is a State." Id. at 236. In 1976, the PCA became directly tied into the field of
international commercial arbitration when the UNCITRAL arbitration rules designated
the Secretary-General of the PCA as the "appointing authority." Id. This led the PCA in
the 1990s to adopt a number of optional arbitration rules based on the UNCITRAL
Rules. Id. at 237.
320. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976).
321. WELLENS, supra note 268, at 221.
322. Id. at 223.
323. Id. Although no arbitrations have been conducted under the Optional Rules for
Private Parties, the Rules were used as a starting point for drafting rules of procedure for
an arbitration proceeding instituted to settle a dispute between the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements and three of its private shareholders. See Spence, supra note 319, at
314-15.
324. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 3.
325. Id. arts. 5-14.
326. Id. arts. 15-30.
327. Id. arts. 32-41.
328. Id. art. 1(1).
329. Id. art. 1(2).
330. Id.
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Loans, the Bank would agree to a waiver of immunity3 3 1-i.e., a party may
"(i) enter judgment upon, or institute a proceeding to enforce, the award in
any court of competent jurisdiction against any other party; (ii) enforce
such judgment by execution; or (iii) pursue any other appropriate remedy
against such other party for the enforcement of the award."
33 2
Third, the International Bureau of the PCA at The Hague is in charge
of the archives of the arbitration proceeding. 33 3 Moreover, "the Interna-
tional Bureau shall, upon written request of all the parties or of the arbitral
tribunal, act as a channel of communications between the parties and the
arbitral tribunal, and provide secretariat services including, inter alia,
arranging for hearing rooms, interpretation, and stenographic or electronic
records of hearings."33 4 Fourth, "[u]nless the parties have agreed other-
wise, the place where the arbitration is to be held shall be The Hague, The
Netherlands. '3 35 Under our proposal, we suspect that the arbitration pro-
ceedings would take place in a location other than The Hague, such as in
New York, NY, or in the member country in which the project is located.
Accordingly, under the rules, "the International Bureau shall inform the
parties and the arbitral tribunal whether it is willing to provide the secreta-
riat and registrar services" '33 6
Fifth, "[t]he arbitral tribunal may determine the locale of the arbitra-
tion within the country agreed upon by the parties. It may hear witnesses
and hold meetings for consultation among its members at any place it
deems appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the arbitra-
tion."'33 7 Finally, "[aifter inviting the views of the parties, the arbitral tribu-
nal may meet at any place it deems appropriate for the inspection of
331. An explicit waiver would be required despite the wording of Article VII, Section 3
of the Bank's charter. It states:
Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has
appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or
has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be brought by
members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members. The property
and assets of the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be
immune from all forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery
of a final judgment against the Bank.
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
art. VII, § 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134. This "facially broad waiver"
has been construed narrowly: "[lit is evident that the World Bank's members could
only have intended to waive the Bank's immunity from suits by its debtors, creditors,
bondholders, and those other potential plaintiffs to whom the Bank would have had to
subject itself to suit in order to achieve its chartered objectives." Mendaro v. World
Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding the Bank immune from employee's
Title VII suit); accord Morgan v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., 752 F. Supp. 492
(D.C. Cir. 1990); see also SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 251-52 (stating that narrow inter-
pretation of Bank's waiver "is generally consistent with the practice in other [non-U.S.]
member countries").
332. General Conditions, supra note 151, § 8.04(k).
333. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 1(4).
334. Id.
335. Id. art. 16(1).
336. Id.
337. Id. art. 16(2).
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property or documents. The parties shall be given sufficient notice to
enable them to be present at such inspection.
338
1. Appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal
Under our proposal-and according to the arbitration provisions set
forth in the Bank's General Conditions for Loans-the arbitral tribunal
would consist of three arbitrators.3 39 The Bank would appoint one arbitra-
tor, and the claimant community would appoint the second arbitrator.
340
The two arbitrators thus appointed would choose the third arbitrator, who
would act as the presiding arbitrator of the tribunal. 34 1 As noted below,
the claimant community would be required to name its arbitrator in the
notice of arbitration.3 42 The Bank would have thirty days after receipt of
the notice to appoint its arbitrator. 343 If the Bank failed to appoint an arbi-
trator within the allotted time, the claimant community would request the
President of the International Court of Justice to appoint the second arbi-
trator. If the President failed to appoint the second arbitrator within thirty
days after the claimant's request, 344 the claimant would request the Secre-
tary-General of the PCA to make the appointment within thirty days of the
request.34 5 If within thirty days after the appointment of the second arbi-
trator, the two arbitrators have not agreed on the choice of the presiding
arbitrator, the presiding arbitrator would be appointed in the same way the
second arbitrator would be chosen if the Bank failed to make a timely
appointment.
Members of the arbitral tribunal would be chosen from a Roster of
Arbitrators comprised of persons nominated by Bank members and the
NGO community.3 46 The Arbitrators would have to be persons who have
been widely recognized for their knowledge and competence relating to the
operations of the World Bank and to development, and who are capable of
exercising independent judgment. They would serve five-year renewable
terms. The parties would be free to select persons who are not on the
Roster, provided they met the requirements of expertise in the field and
independence. 3 47
338. Id. art. 16(3).
339. See id. art. 5 (providing that three arbitrators will be appointed if the parties have
not previously agreed on the number of arbitrators-one or three).
340. See id. art. 7(1).
341. Id.
342. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
343. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 7(2).
344. Article 7(2)(b) of the Optional Rules stipulates sixty days. See id. art. 7(2)(b).
345. Id.
346. According to Article 8 of the Optional Rules, "[iun appointing arbitrators pursu-
ant to these Rules, the parties and the appointing authority are free to designate persons
who are not Members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague." Id. art.
8(3).
347. A party may challenge the selection of an arbitrator on the grounds either that
the arbitrator will not be impartial or independent, or that the arbitrator is not qualified.
See id. arts. 9-12.
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2. The Arbitral Proceedings
The affected community 348 would commence arbitration proceedings
by providing the Bank with a notice of arbitration.3 49 In addition to
appointing an arbitrator, the notice would have to include a statement of
the claim: 350
* A statement indicating that the arbitration is being demanded by
"any two or more persons who share some common interests or
concerns;"
35 1
* A statement identifying the project and the "action or omission of
the Bank to follow its own operational policies and procedures dur-
ing the design, appraisal and/or implementation of [the] Bank-
financed project," whatever the case may be;3 52
* A statement identifying how the Bank's action or omission will have
an "actual or threatened material adverse effect on [the claimants']
rights or interests; 3 53
* If applicable, a statement, along with the submission of the Interme-
diator's public report, indicating how the Bank was not in compli-
ance with the agreed upon plan of action;
* If applicable, a statement, along with the submission of the Interme-
diator's public report, indicating the inadequacies of the Bank's pro-
posed resolution of the complaint at issue;
* If applicable, a statement indicating any Bank-caused damages that
arose within one year after the completion of the project or the final
disbursement of the loan; and
* A statement indicating the relief or remedy sought.
Within a time period to be determined by the tribunal, the Bank
would submit its statement of defense to the arbitral tribunal and the
claimant community. 35 4 The statement of defense would include:
* A statement identifying any disputes of fact;
* A statement asserting that the Bank
0 was in compliance with its own policies and procedures, as
reflected in the Intermediator's public report (submitted along
with the statement of defense), or
348. The proceeding would be in the nature of a class action. Accordingly, the arbi-
tral tribunal would certify the class by determining common injury. In the notice of
arbitration the claimants would be required to show shared interest or concerns. Experi-
ence thus far under the Inspection Panel procedure suggests that certifying a class
would not be problematic.
349. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 3(1)-(2).
350. To expedite the resolution of the dispute, our proposal differs from the Optional
Rules. Under the Optional Rules, the notice of arbitration does not need to contain a
statement of the claim. Id. art. 3(3). If the notice does not contain such a statement, the
arbitral tribunal fixes the period of time within which the claimant must communicate
the statement. Id. art. 18(1).
351. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note 50, 9 9.
352. Operating Procedures, supra note 1, at 512.
353. Id.
354. See Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 19(1).
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° had complied with the agreed upon plan of action or had excusa-
ble grounds for not complying with the plan of action, or
° had proposed a plan of action that would have brought it into full
compliance with its own policies and procedures and that plan
was unreasonably or in bad faith rejected by the claimant
community;
A statement, if applicable, denying liability for damages.
As to the proceeding itself, the arbitral tribunal could hold hearings at
the request of either party. If no such request is made, the tribunal would
decide whether to hold such hearings or whether to conduct the proceed-
ings based on the submission of documents alone.355 With respect to bur-
den, "[e]ach party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to
support its claim or defence."3 56 If the arbitral proceeding followed (i) a
conclusion by the Intermediator that the Bank had complied with its poli-
cies and procedures, or (ii) an unsuccessful resolution of a Request for
Claim Resolution, the claimant community would carry a "heavy burden"
of showing that (a) the Bank was not in compliance with its policies and
procedures, or (b) the claimant community acted reasonably and in good
faith when it rejected the Bank's proposed plan of action.
In keeping with current Inspection Panel procedure, and as contem-
plated by the Optional Rules, testimony by affected community members
or their representatives, testimony by government officials and authorities
in charge of the project, and nonpublic documents, would all remain confi-
dential. 35 7 Just as the Inspection Panel has hired consultants in its investi-
gations, so too would the arbitral tribunal be able to appoint experts to
report on specific issues.3 58 As to interim measures, either party may
request the arbitral tribunal to issue interim measures necessary to pre-
serve their respective rights of either party.35 9 With respect to the applica-
ble law,
the arbitral tribunal shall have regard both to the rules of the organization
concerned and to the law applicable to the agreement or relationship out of
or in relation to which the dispute arises and, where appropriate, to the gen-
eral principles governing the law of international organizations and to the
rules of general international law.360
3. The Award
Upon closure of the hearings, the arbitral tribunal would issue its final
award. The award could be declaratory, indicating whether or not the
Bank was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; whether it
was abiding by its plan of action or had an excuse for not doing so; or
whether the Bank's proposed plan of action was reasonable, made in good
355. Id. art. 15(2).
356. Id. art. 24(1).
357. Id. art. 25(4).
358. Id. art. 27(1).
359. Id. art. 26(1).
360. Id. art. 33(1).
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faith, and should have been accepted by the claimant community. With
respect to the third issue, if the arbitral tribunal decided that the Bank's
plan of action was unreasonable or made in bad faith, it would issue an
award for specific performance which would include a plan of action that it
deemed as in compliance with the Bank's policies and procedures. The
tribunal would also award any damages that the claimant community
could prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, including damages that
were realized within one year after the completion of the project or final
disbursement of the loan. All decisions or awards of the arbitral tribunal
would be made by a majority of the arbitrators. 36 1 All awards would be
made public and would be final and binding on the parties. 36 2
4. Costs
The Optional Rules for Private Parties state that the arbitral tribunal
will fix the costs of arbitration in its award. 36 3 Costs include, among other
things, the fees of the arbitral tribunal, travel and other expenses incurred
by the arbitrators and any witnesses, the costs of expert advice, and the
"costs for legal representation and assistance of the successful party if such
costs were claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only to the extent
that the arbitral tribunal determines that the amount of such costs is rea-
sonable."'3 64 In principle, the costs of arbitration are borne by the unsuc-
cessful party.36 5 "However, the arbitral tribunal may apportion each of
such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is rea-
sonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case." 36 6 Moreover,
with respect to the costs of legal representation, "the arbitral tribunal, tak-
ing into account the circumstances of the case, shall be free to determine
which party shall bear such costs or may apportion such costs between the
parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable. '36 7
We believe the costs of the arbitration should be borne by the unsuc-
cessful party only in the unlikely event where the claimant community
brought a manifestly frivolous arbitration claim or when the Bank clearly
acted in bad faith. Otherwise, each party should bear its own legal
expenses and, like the arbitration provisions under the General Conditions
for Loans, the costs should be divided equally between the parties.
361. Id. art. 31(1).
362. Id. art. 32(2)-(5). The Optional Rules state that the "award may be made public
only with the consent of both parties." Id. art. 32(5). Under our proposal, arbitral
awards must be made public. We do not refer to "decisions," because there is a distinc-
tion between decisions and awards. "'Awards' are decisions of the tribunal which finally
dispose of an issue, or issues, between the parties and which will be given recognition
and effect by state courts .... Decisions and directions which relate only to procedural
matters ... are not properly described as 'awards'." CAPPER, supra note 281, at 111.
363. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 38.
364. Id.
365. Id. art. 40(1).
366. Id.
367. Id. art. 40(2).
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This proposal raises the obvious question of how claimant communi-
ties would bear the costs of arbitration. First, with respect to the costs of
legal representation-relating to both filing a Request for Claim Resolution
and arbitration-we are confident that the major national and international
law firms would be eager to represent claimant communities on a pro bono
basis. A clearinghouse for such work could be provided by the Advocates
for International Development (A4ID)-an organization which coordinates
legal pro bono work throughout the world with respect to issues relating to
international trade and development. 3 68 A4ID also works closely with
major international NGOs, such as The Centre for African Policy and Peace
Strategy, ActionAid, and Oxfam. 369 Second, with respect to the other costs
of arbitration, organizations such as A4ID could work with the NGO com-
munity and other donors to raise funds to cover such costs. Moreover, the
PCA maintains a Financial Assistance Fund, which is intended to help
developing countries meet part of the costs involved in international arbi-
tration. 3 70 The Fund consists of "voluntary financial contributions by
States, intergovernmental organizations, national institutions, as well as
natural and legal persons."37 1 Although the Fund currently provides assis-
tance only to a "Qualifying State,"' 3 72 there is no reason why the rules of
the Fund could not be amended to provide financial assistance to claimant
communities.
5. Enforcement
To demonstrate to the world that it believes in true accountability-
and to maintain its legitimacy-the World Bank should willingly comply
with the arbitral award. If enforcement were necessary, the claimant com-
munity would seek enforcement of the award under domestic law or via
international conventions. Here we will limit our commentary to the
widely adopted 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
368. Advocates for International Development (A4ID), Access to Justice for the Devel-
oping World, http://a4lD.org/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). The authors
have spoken with Chris Marshall, who chairs A41D's Board of Trustees, about the possi-
bility of having A41D act as a clearinghouse for pro bono legal representation under our
proposal. Although Mr. Marshall stated that the Board would have to approve such activ-
ity, he was very supportive of the idea in general and believed there would be many
lawyers who would be eager to represent claimant communities. Interview with Chris
Marshall, Chairman, Board of Trustees A4ID (Spring 2007).
369. ActionAid International, http://www.actionaid.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2008);
The Centre for African Policy & Peace Strategy (CAPPS), http://www.thinkafrica.org/
(last visited Nov. 14, 2008); Oxfam International, http://www.oxfam.org/en/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2008).
370. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Financial Assistance Fund, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid= 1179 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008); see Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Financial Assistance Fund for Settlement of International Disputes: Terms of
Reference and Guidelines, ' 2, Dec. 11, 1995 [hereinafter PCA Financial Assistance Fund
uidelines], available at hrtp://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/fihes/FUNDENG.pdf.
371. PCA Financial Assistance Fund Guidelines, supra note 370, c 4.
372. Id. c91 5-6.
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Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention).3 73
Article III of the New York Convention sets forth the basic obligation of
each Contracting State to "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon. '3 74 The United States has implemented the Conven-
tion via the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 37 5 Under the FAA, U.S. federal
district courts have original jurisdiction over actions arising under the New
York Convention.
3 76
For the present purposes, we raise three issues with respect to applica-
tion of the New York Convention. First, the Convention requires that an
arbitration agreement be "in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not."'3 77 Certainly the Bank has no contractual rela-
tionship with claimant communities with respect to its obligation to follow
its own policies and procedures. 3 78 The language of the Convention, how-
ever, appears to cover non-contractual claims, such as tort claims, 37 9 as
would be the case with respect to affected communities' claims against the
Bank.380 Second, the Convention provides that member states may declare
that the provisions apply only to relationships that are considered "as com-
373. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 251, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
374. Id. art. Ill.
375. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-208 (1980).
376. Id. § 203.
377. New York Convention, supra note 373, art. II, 1 1.
378. SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 258.
379. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 153 (2d ed. 2001).
380. Because adversely affected community members are not parties to a loan agree-
ment between the Bank and the borrowing country, they would need to bring a claim in
tort. De Feyter suggests that claimants would argue negligence. De Feyter, supra note
225, at 129. Claimants would argue that "the Bank breached its duty to take care by not
contemplating the injurious effect on the affected persons, when deciding not to insist
on the implementation of the [loan] agreement, or on compliance with its operational
policies." Id. at 129-30. He also argues that the Bank could be held liable if the bor-
rower fails to comply with its international human rights obligations. See id. at 130. We
disagree with this proposition to the extent it makes the Bank liable for a member's
breach of its human rights obligations in the absence of a link to the Bank's policies and
procedures. Shihata opposes liability based on fault. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World
Bank Inspection Panel- Its Historical, Legal and Operational Aspects, in THE INSPECTION
PANEL OF THE WORLD BANK: A DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 7, 43 (Gudmundur
Alfredsson & Rolf Ring eds., 2001). Shihata argues that the Bank's failure to follow its
own policies and procedures does not "amount to a legal obligation vis-a-vis that
affected party with whom the Bank has no contractual relationship." Id. Even if fault
liability were possible, "the mere failure by the Bank to observe its policies would rarely
amount to a fault under applicable law; these policies typically require high standards
beyond what borrowers or their foreign financiers otherwise need to observe under
national or international law." Id. at 42; see SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 254-58 (discuss-
ing the limits of lender liability). We believe that the creation of the Inspection Panel
and the "case law" it has promulgated since its inception clearly indicate that the Bank
and the various stakeholders in the Bank's projects believe the Bank has a duty to abide
by its operational policies and that there should be a remedy for harm caused by its
failure to abide by its policies. If the arbitral tribunal holds that the Bank is liable for
damages, and if the Bank believes the borrowing country should be ultimately liable for
the damages caused by the harm, the Bank can bring an arbitration proceeding against
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mercial under the national law of the State making [the] declaration."'3 8 1
The United States, like other nations, has made this declaration. 3 82
Although U.S. courts have construed the term "commercial" broadly, 38 3 it
may be problematic to construe the Bank's compliance with its own poli-
cies and procedures as commercial activities. 38 4 Consequently, enforce-
ment of an arbitral award under our proposal may have to be pursued in a
country that has not made this declaration. 38 5 Finally, under the New
York Convention, a court can refuse to enforce an award that is not "capa-
ble of settlement by arbitration. ' 38 6 Moreover, Article V, paragraph (2)(a)
states that an arbitration award need not be recognized if "[t]he subject
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law" of the country where recognition is sought. 38 7 Although this non-
arbitrability doctrine has been narrowed over the years,38 8 it is conceivable
that a court may invoke this doctrine with respect to ordering the Bank,
pursuant to the arbitral award, to comply with its own policies and
procedures.
Conclusion
Our proposal would bring about real and effective accountability on
the part of the World Bank. Fundamentally, it eliminates the Bank's pater-
nalistic, biased, and politically motivated approach to resolving claims
brought by affected claimant communities. Specifically, a politically moti-
vated Board would no longer determine whether exceptional circum-
stances exist for foreign representation of claimant communities. Given
today's globalized world, the non-local representation limitation is anach-
ronistic.389 Accordingly, as provided for in the Optional Rules for Arbitra-
tion, there is no reason why an affected community should not be able to
"be represented or assisted by persons of their choice." 390 In other words,
there is no compelling reason why a party in an arbitration proceeding-or
the borrowing country pursuant to the Bank's General Conditions for Loans. See gener-
ally General Conditions, supra note 151.
381. New York Convention, supra note 373, art. 1, '1 3.
382. BORN, supra note 379, at 149.
383. Id. at 150.
384. See SHIHATA, supra note 22, at 252 ("Neither the Bank's lending operations, nor,
clearly, the issuance and observance of its policies and procedures are commercial activ-
ities pursued for profit purposes.").
385. Many of the major European countries have not made this declaration. See CAP-
PER, supra note 281, at 149-52.
386. New York Convention, supra note 373, art. 11, '1 1.
387. Id. art. V, ' 2.
388. See generally BORN, supra note 379, at 243-95.
389. A study of claims brought before the Inspection Panel revealed that a majority of
cases were led by Southern NGOs, with most of the remaining claims being brought by a
coalition of Southern and Northern NGOs. SeeJonathan Fox & Kay Treakle, Concluding
Propositions, in DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK
INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 56, at 279, 280-81. The study's authors therefore argue
that "[t]his evidence puts the charge that the 'Panel process is a tool of Northern NGOs'
to rest." Id.
390. Optional Rules, supra note 282, art. 4.
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at the pre-arbitration stage-should be denied the autonomy to choose its
representation from among the global legal and NGO communities. More-
over, under our proposal there would be no issue as to whether the Board
would authorize an investigation, even under a "no-objection" basis.
Importantly, our proposal would give claimant communities a true
voice and remedy. Our proposed administrative remedy under the OCR
would actively involve members of the claimant community in an indepen-
dent claim resolution mechanism that combines the compliance and prob-
lem-solving functions that currently are separate resolution components at
multilateral development banks such as the ADB.3 9 1 If a plan of action
were agreed upon at the administrative level, the requirement of Board
approval for the plan's implementation would be eliminated. Compliance
with the plan of action would be monitored by the claimant community's
legal or NGO representation in conjunction with the OCR Director. If the
Bank failed to abide by the plan of action, the claimant community would
have the option of instituting truly independent arbitration proceedings
and seeking damages for any harm that might have resulted from the
Bank's breach of the agreement. In the event that the administrative pro-
cess was unsuccessful and that the arbitral tribunal decided that the Bank's
plan of action was unreasonable or made in bad faith, the arbitral tribunal
could order its own plan of action to be implemented without Board
approval. Finally, under our proposal communities could bring an arbitra-
tion claim for damages realized within one year after the completion of the
project or final disbursement of the loan.
While our proposal seeks to bring about real and effective accountabil-
ity on the part of the Bank, it is also consistent with the doctrine of func-
tional necessity. 3 92 First, our proposal does not expand the current
mandate of the Inspection Panel. Claimant communities would still be lim-
ited to bringing claims alleging noncompliance with the Bank's own poli-
cies and procedures. Second, although under our proposal the Board
would no longer have the last word on implementation of a plan of action,
the Bank's Management would still consult with the Board with respect to
the resolution of a claim.
Third, although excessive arbitration against the World Bank arguably
could impede its ability to function, we foresee that most claims, especially
given the possibility of arbitration, would be resolved at the administrative
level, and that the Bank would willingly comply with the agreed plan of
action. Fourth, in the arbitration proceeding, the Bank would be entitled to
present an excuse for failing to abide by the agreed plan of action, and the
claimant community would have the "heavy burden" of showing that (i) the
391. The third function identified by Professor Bradlow, lessons-learned, would be
fulfilled by the OCR Director's submission of an annual report to the Board. See supra
notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. As Singer has indicated, the doctrine
of functional necessity, strictly speaking, is not applicable when an international organi-
zation expressly waives immunity. Singer, supra note 278, at 80. In such cases, the
tribunal "should determine whether the organization has in fact waived its jurisdictional
immunity, regardless of whether this would benefit the organization." Id.
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Bank was not in compliance with its policies and procedures, or (ii) the
claimant community acted reasonably and in good faith when it rejected
the Bank's proposed plan of action at the administrative level. Finally,
claimant communities would bear the costs of arbitration if they brought a
manifestly frivolous claim.
We recognize that ultimately our proposal rests on a political decision:
the World Bank's willingness to waive its immunity. In this regard, we con-
cur with de Feyter's observation that the Bank should waive its immunity
"in recognition of its role as an autonomous international actor, and of the
important impact its actions and omissions have on the human rights con-
ditions of people affected by their projects. '3 93 We also recognize that lim-
iting our proposal to the World Bank might to some extent cause countries
to seek funding at other multilateral financial institutions that do not allow
adversely affected communities to bring arbitral claims. Ideally, therefore,
an arbitration option should be adopted uniformly.
393. De Feyter, supra note 225, at 134-35.
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